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Latin America on 
the threshold of 
the 1980s 
Enrique V. Iglesias 
With the end oí the 1970s at hand, by way of drawing 
up a general balance the author sketches die main 
features of Latin American development in the re-
cent past and notes the main challenges which the 
region will have to face in die years to come. He 
begins by recognizing that since the war, and 
especially during the 1960s and the beginning of the 
present decade, Latin America achieved vigorous 
economic growth, but he stresses that this did not 
succeed in solving some of the most serious social 
problems, while it also brought with it a growing 
internationalization of the economies of the region, 
with a consequent increase in their external vul-
nerability. Furthermore, towards the middle of the 
1970s there was a reversal of the expansive cycle as a 
result of the flagging performance of the central 
economies, the changes in the international prices of 
some goods, especially oil, and the internal difficul-
ties faced by the national development patterns 
themselves. 
In the light of this situation, he holds that 
redoubled efforts must be made to ensure that in 
the coming years the countries move towards an 
equitable, dynamic and independent form of de-
velopment. The achievement of these objectives 
involves, in turn, the capacity to overcome three 
fundamental challenges: improving the social irra-
diation of economic growth, speeding up its rate and 
making it more independent. 
After the presentation of this framework of 
analysis, the major part of the paper is devoted to 
consideration of the requisites imposed by these 
objectives, the potentiality of the region tor achiev-
ing them, and some of the most suitable strategies 
for doing so. The article concludes with some 
reflections in which the writer sums up his views 
and stresses the need for a systematic reappraisal 
of the ideas about the economic and social develop-
ment of the region in order to adapt them to a rapidly 
changing context. 
"Executive Secretary ot CEPAL. 
Introduction 
As on other occasions, I should like to take this 
opportunity to express some thoughts on the 
economic and social situation of the region, in 
the light of our observation of the many diverse 
facets of Latin American reality. 
This meeting is taking place at a special 
moment in our history, as one decade draws 
to a close and another dawns. These moments 
of transition have a particular attraction in the 
historical evolution of our societies, for they are 
suitable occasions for exercises of introspec-
tion which enable us, as we look at the recent 
past, to put forward some hypotheses concern-
ing the major problems and challanges which 
will face us in the 1980s. An exercise of this 
kind is particularly timely and necessary at a 
moment when the governments of the region 
must turn to the task of laying the foundations 
of what is to be the international development 
strategy for the forthcoming decade, to be 
discussed by the United Nations General As-
sembly in 1980. 
This kind of analysis, however, is inher-
ently fraught with difficulties, for obvious 
reasons. In the first place, we are living today 
under the sign of change and uncertainty in 
all spheres. This is clearly visible in the 
international economic situation and the 
violent changes in the political, economic and 
social settings which affect the very values on 
which we believed that post-war civilization 
was firmly based. These changes transcend 
the confines of economics, and call into ques-
tion in various ways man's present and con-
tinued existence on this planet. 
Furthermore, the growing interdepen-
dence among the nations of the globe —another 
sign of our times— means that no-one can 
escape the effects of these changes, and our 
region has certainly felt their impact especially 
strongly. One thing is sure, namely that follow-
ing a period of extraordinary prosperity and 
confidence in a stable future, which began 
some thirty years ago, we have entered a 
dangerous period in which feelings of inse-
curity and anxiety about the future prevail at 
every level. 
It is therefore a hazardous business to 
venture on hypotheses about the probable 
course of future events. All forecasts which 
8 CEPAL REVIEW N.° 9 / December 1979 
go beyond the short term may become quite 
unrealistic very shortly after being formulated. 
It is equally difficult to formulate hypothe-
ses about the future of Latin America, again 
for a number of reasons. Perhaps the most 
important of these is the course followed by 
the world economy, which has such a direct 
effect on the development of the countries of 
the region. Equally important are the great 
changes which have taken place in Latin 
America in recent years. New political situa-
tions, new economic experiences and new so-
cial factors have emerged, revealing profound 
changes which in many respects are often in 
keeping with those which have occurred at 
the world level. 
This has meant that the common traits of 
the region have been overlaid by increasingly 
clear and unmitigated disparities between 
some of our countries, stemming partly from 
their varying geographic and demographic 
size, their different economic and social struc-
tures, or the particular way in which they are 
linked with the world economy. This explains 
why, despite the common denominators, it is 
more difficult now that previously to general-
ize about the problems of the region. Always 
risky, such generalizations have now become 
more dangerous than ever. 
Despi te these obstacles, however, re-
flection about the immediate past and possible 
future scenarios for the region as a whole is 
A. The turnaround of the 1970s 
Anyone looking at the main feature of the world 
economic situation in the 1970s must conclude 
that the decade will be remembered for two 
fundamental aspects: the culmination of a 
cycle of unprecedented progress which began 
in the 1950s, and the profound change of 
direction in this trend which occurred in the 
middle of the 1970s. 
particularly necessary and opportune. The 
speed with which events are taking place in the 
modern world often obliges us to give priority 
to immediate problems. Thus, by force of 
circumstance, there is a growing tendency at 
all levels to focus on the short term, a tendency 
which should be overcome from time to time, 
however, in order to draw on the wealth of 
regional experience for guidelines to orient 
future action. 
This , indeed, has been the role of CEPAL 
over its many years of existence. We therefore 
feel bound, on occasions such as this, to express 
our thoughts to the governments of the region 
— in all honesty, and fully aware of the limita-
tions of the undertaking— in order to let them 
know our views on the fundamental problems 
of the day and the great challenges of the 
approaching decade. 
I t is in this spirit that I wish to make a 
number of comments on three major areas of 
concern: 
—Firstly, the main lessons to be learned 
from the economic and social evolution of the 
1970s. 
—Secondly, the balance-sheet of the 
achievements and shortcomings of the process 
of change observed in the region in recent 
decades. 
—Lastly, what we consider to be the main 
challenges of the near future. 
If, looking back, the period between 1970 
and 1973/1974 represented the euphoric 
culmination of the post-war cycle of expansion, 
the succeeding years saw the interruption of 
that process and the beginning of a stage of 
substantial adjustments which are still continu-
ing, and whose complexity, intensity and dura-
tion make it impossible to discern as yet the 
nature of the new stage which may take shape 
after this interregnum. 
I 
The 1970s: culmination of a cycle, interruption 
and advance towards the unknown 
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Some tend to view the 1973 rise in oil 
prices as the decisive element in this uneven 
evolution. However, it is important not to 
exaggerate its importance, or to ignore other 
significant factors, for in reality this rise in 
prices was superimposed, in the central eco-
nomies, on a variety of monetary and financial 
upheavals which date from the final years of 
the previous decade, and which emerged 
clearly in 1971. 
Even at that time the embryonic symptoms 
of "stagflation" had already been diagnosed, 
and deep thought was being given to the 
possible consequence of the policies designed 
to remedy it by decreasing growth rates.1 Thus 
the "oil t rauma" should be regarded more as 
the spark which precipitated and aggravated 
a worsening situation than as the sole or basic 
cause of it. 
T h e fact is that, for a complex set of 
reasons, a significant break took place in a trend 
of progress and economic growth which had 
begun two and a half decades previously and 
which had begun to seem indefinite. 
If the problem is viewed from the stand-
point of our region, a similar evolution can be 
identified in the economic field: the culmina-
tion of a dynamic cycle of growth in the product 
at the beginning of the decade, followed by a 
decl ine in the expansionary cycle in the second 
half of the period. 
T h e first essential e lement in the decline 
in the region's former buoyant trend was, of 
course, the performance of the central eco-
nomies. The document presented to the 
C E G A N meeting by CEPAL records with 
startling clarity how growth in the region has 
followed the ups and downs in the central 
countries, and particularly the downward 
tendency starting in 1974/1975 (see figure 1). 
Notwithstanding slight differences in 
trajectory, intensity and performance in spe-
cific cases —to which I shall refer below— 
this parallelism confirms the long-standing 
conception of the reflex character of the cycli-
cal movements at the periphery —a fact which 
See, for example, CEPAL, Economic Survey of Latin 
America, 1971 (United Nations publication: Sales N.° 
E.73.II.G.1). 
we must not forget in our current discussions 
on interdependence. 
At the same time, one can also see with 
clarity the impact of the realignment of inter-
national prices, and particularly the rise in 
the price of petroleum. The latter has had very 
different effects depending on the country in 
question: so much so that it has necessitated a 
systematic differentiation between countries 
which export fuels and the remaining non-fuel-
exporting countries —the majority— which 
have had to face up to different degress of 
dependence on imports. 
It is worth while emphasizing that the 
serious problems of the latter have not led to 
conflicts or animosity vis-à-vis the former, the 
fundamental reason being that the affected 
countries have not forgotten two very impor-
tant aspects of the matter. 
Firstly, it is almost beyond doubt that no 
other primary commodity —in this case non-
renewable— had suffered such a damaging 
deterioration in its price in the post-war period. 
In fact, as is demonstrated in a recent CEPAL 
publication, the real price of petroleum 
dropped by almost half between 1950/1951 and 
1973, before it was readjusted.2 This process 
might well be regarded as a clear demonstra-
tion of the historical short-sightedness of the 
traditional policy on raw materials and its 
consequences. In that context the following 
statement by the President of the European 
Economic Community, Mr. Roy Jenkins, is 
telling: 
"For far too long the industrialized world 
assumed that it had a divine right to indefinite 
supplies of cheap energy. We finally seem to 
be learning from our mistakes, although the 
learning process is still too slow."3 
Secondly, leaving aside possible reserva-
tions concerning the form of the price readjust-
ment and the use made of the increased 
revenue, the affected countries could not but 
appreciate the potential implications of joint 
2 See J. W. Mullen, World oil prices: prospects and 
implications for energy policy-makers in Latin America s 
oil-deficit countries. Cuadernos de la CEPAL, Santiago, 
1978. 
^Europe and the Developing World, speech delivered 
to the Overseas Development Institute in London on 8 
March 1979. 
Figure I 
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action in favour of an adequate return for their 
commodity exports. 
Finally, it is also clear that the upsets of 
the recent period are linked with the inherent 
characteristics of national forms of develop-
ment and the policies adopted to deal with 
them. Despi te the favourable climate for 
expansion which prevailed until 1973/1974 in 
Latin America, one cannot forget that even then 
many countries were encountering serious 
difficulties and uncertainty concerning the 
continuation of the process of transformations 
in production and the form of that process, 
especially as regards its social impact. Al-
though it had specific features in each country, 
this situation was repeated both in the larger 
economies and in the medium-sized and 
smaller economies. 
In this way the particular problems posed 
by the international economic situation were 
added to the specific problems of each country 
and were either exacerbated or alleviated 
depend ing on the countries' degree of vul-
nerability and the capacity of national policies 
to deal with them. 
B. The pressures of the conjuncture: new 
faces for old problems 
T h e upheaval in the middle of the decade took 
place against this background, and economic 
policies had to face, in addition to the tradi-
tional challenges, the more pressing problems 
arising from the international economic situa-
tion. 
On the one hand, the countries most 
affected by the situation were obliged to tackle 
simultaneously problems on their external 
accounts, the repercussions of inflation, and 
their depressive consequences for production 
activity, employment and income distribution. 
The policies differed according to the coun-
tries, bu t all of them had to take dramatic steps, 
combining and re-ordering their defensive 
policies in very different ways. The three-way 
choice between growth rates, external borrow-
ing and the degree of inflation was as frequent 
as it was painful, and old problems reappeared 
which the region thought it had overcome in 
the euphoria of the beginning of the decade. 
Secondly, the countries which benefited 
from a rise in their foreign currency earnings 
had to cope with the task of assimilating the 
additional resources in such a way as to ensure 
maximum impact on development and mini-
mum effect on inflation. Their position was 
more favourable than that of the former, but it 
undoubtedly put the tools of economic policy 
to the test. 
it whould be mistaken to liken this crisis 
of the mid-1970s to previous crises, for two 
reasons which, it seems to us, should be 
underl ined with particular emphasis in order 
to describe the new situation correctly. 
(a) The 'international financial permis-
siveness' which, as a result of the unpre-
cedent abundance of financial resources 
arising from the oil surpluses and the crisis in 
the industrial centres, made it possible to 
moderate the effects of the payments imbal-
ances and postpone many of the costs of the 
adjustment in international prices. Of course, 
this also led to considerable borrowing, which 
by the end of 1978 was estimated at about 
US$ 100 billion for the region as a whole. 
This financial permissiveness was a com-
pletely new factor in the historical experience 
both of the region and of the world as a whole. 
While in most cases the balance-of-payments 
crisis did not have a dramatic impact on 
internal development, it did make it necessary 
to adjust growth rates and incur substantial 
loans to which we shall refer again below. 
( b) The region's 'new capacity to defend its 
interests', which manifested itself in many 
ways. There is no doubt that vital importance 
was assumed by the progress achieved in 
previous decades in the broadening and diver-
sification of the structure of production: that is 
to say, industrialization in its widest sense. In 
this regard, and with reference to the coun-
tries which best managed to cope with the 
setbacks produced by the economic situation, 
a recent report submitted to the Group of 24 
points out very correctly that: 
"...Their capacity for adjustment was subs-
tantial because of earlier progress that they 
had made towards the diversification of the 
domestic economy in general and of the struc-
ture of exports in particular."4 
4UNDP/UNCTAD, The Balance of Payments Adjust-
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O n the other hand, due recognition should 
also be given to the high degree of maturity 
and flexibility achieved by national economic 
policies as a result of the greater experience 
acquired in managing the economy at both the 
public and private levels. 
As a result, adjustment policies of greater 
or lesser scope were introduced in the different 
countries; a high rate of expansion of exports, 
particularly non-traditional exports, was 
maintained; and high levels were attained in 
trade within Latin America, which functioned 
as an anti-cyclical factor at a time of weakness 
in international markets. 
No less significant for the region was the 
marked capacity to secure resources from pri-
vate financial markets and the continuation 
of a high rate of direct foreign investment by 
the transnational corporations, as is indicated 
by recent secretariat studies. 
The combination of plentiful external 
financing and the improvement in the defence 
capacity of the economies meant that although 
in the majority of the Latin American countries 
the growth rates of the product decreased, 
they did not do so as much as might have been 
expected in view of the crisis in the central 
economies. 
T h e cost that this implied in terms of 
indebtedness has already been mentioned, but 
it was certainly not the only one. In social 
matters there were large-scale setbacks resul-
ting from the policies of readjustment and also 
from the rate of inflation, which regained 
momentum in many countries. Both these 
types of costs had regressive effects on the 
poorer sectors and on rates of investment. 
C. The external factor conditioning the 
immediate prospects; the evolution of the 
central economies 
It is clear from several points of view that the 
immediate prospects of the regional situation 
will be strongly influenced, in the case of the 
great majority of the countries of the region, 
by the behaviour of the international economy, 
which in turn is basically determined by the 
ment Process in Developing Countries: Report to the 
Group of Twenty-four, New York, January 1979, p. 6. 
behaviour of the central economies, i.e., by 
the recovery of their growth rate and the 
attainment of acceptable levels of price sta-
bility and equilibrium in their balance of 
payments. 
This is not the place to attempt to analyse 
the significance and the projections of the 
present weak level of activity of the indus-
trialized countries, on the subject of which 
thousands of pages have been written in recent 
years. It is, however, both necessary and 
possible to highlight some aspects of vital 
interest to our region and to the Third World 
in general. 
Some mistaken analogies have now been 
dispelled, such as the attempt to characterize 
the present crisis by evoking the Great Depres-
sion of the 1930s or the assumption made that 
this crisis was yet another of the transient 
upsets of the post-war period. Neither is the 
case. 
Instead, the predominant view is that a 
deep-seated, difficult and lasting readjust-
ment is taking place at the level of the central 
economies and the relations between them, on 
the one hand, and their links with the rest of 
the world on the other. 
As far as the first element is concerned, 
the contradictory features of this crisis 
spawned by the economic system of the indus-
trial market economy countries are much in 
evidence. 
In addition to the elements which are 
common to all crises —decline of private 
investment, reduction of real rates of profits, 
increase in unemployment, growth of idle 
installed capacity— there are others such as 
active and persistent inflation, which repre-
sents a notable contrast to the situations of 
deflation typical of such conjunctures in the 
past. The well-known scenario of "stagflation" 
has created a dilemma which is too much for 
the Keynesian therapies used to solve the 
problem on other occasions and overwhelms 
them completely: any effort to secure growth 
through traditional policies appears to be frus-
trated by the activation of inflationary pres-
sures, while policies directed at reducing such 
pressures tend to aggravate the slowing down 
of production. 
Although the disequilibria in the external 
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accounts have played a substantial role in some 
countries, it is equally true that the same dilem-
mas also occur in countries with surpluses, and 
this contradictory situation constitutes another 
of the seemingly insoluble problems raised by 
the impotence of the policies so feverishly 
sought or attempted. 
What are the options available in the light 
of the immediate prospects of the international 
conjuncture? 
Some main options —which are not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive in all aspects— may 
be deduced from the variety of analyses and 
opinions on the short- and medium-term pros-
pects of the present situation. 
T h e first is that the situation of the last few 
years will continue its precarious existence, 
with recurring ups and downs in the priority 
assigned to and the successes and failures 
achieved in the reactivation of growth and the 
control of inflation and external disequilibria. 
The second is that the obstacles to the 
more rapid growth of the production process 
and of external trade and financial transactions 
will get worse, opening the way for more 
clearly restrictive policies and a situation at 
least resembling that of a traditional or "clas-
sical" crisis. 
T h e third possibility —and certainly the 
most favourable— is that the present crisis will 
culminate in a transition towards a more favour-
able scenario in which the central economies 
will succeed in making the necessary structural 
and institutional adjustments, and that this will 
facilitate new forms of insertion in external 
trade and better opportunities for the devel-
opment of the periphery. 
This option reminds us of the lucid defi-
nition given by our fondly remembered master, 
José Medina Echavarria, who said that in the 
strict etymological sense a crisis should be 
understood as a certain moment in the evolu-
tion of a system which shows sufficient signs of 
fluctuation and upheaval to indicate a state of 
transition, but which does not exclude either 
the system's strengthening and recovery or its 
final breakdown and ruin. 
Let us adopt the relatively optimistic hypo-
thesis that we are living in a period of readjust-
ments which will later evolve into a broader and 
more favourable course for the world economy. 
It seems reasonable to suppose that even 
in such a case the transition will involve some 
years of risks and sacrifices which will be very 
different for countries of the periphery like 
those of Latin America. These risks will 
perhaps be more serious than those experi-
enced in the last part of the present decade, and 
it is consequently essential to prepare for 
tackling and overcoming them. 
The first risk arises out of the continuing 
situation of slow growth and persistent infla-
tion in the central countries. This stands in the 
way of the necessary growth of our exports and 
makes imports continually more expensive. 
This general effect becomes worse in propor-
tion as the industrial countries resort to policies 
which aim at the reduction of growth and trade 
rather than their necessary expansion through 
the structural adjustments required in their 
domestic economies. 
In this respect it is of interest to recall some 
recent statements. At a meeting of the Group of 
24 he ld in March this year, the communiqué 
issued by the Ministers present expressed 
dismay at the proliferation of trade restrictions 
in the developed countries. Another forum 
carrying considerable weight —the Interim 
Committee of the Board of Governors on the 
International Monetary System— announced 
that since its last analysis of the world eco-
nomic situation in September 1978 there had 
been some worsening of the prospects for 
economic growth in the industrial countries, 
increasing inflation, a slow rate of expansion in 
international trade and a tendency in some 
countries to resort to protectionist measures. 
These developments in external condi-
tions are already being reflected in the eco-
nomies of the countries of the region, although 
with notable differences between one country 
and another: not only between the oil-export-
ing countries and the rest but also within each 
group. 
Thus, it can easily be seen that, despite the 
efforts made, the deficits on current account 
still stand at very high levels compared with 
the beginning of the decade, while there has 
been a continuous increase in the amounts of 
indebtedness in respect of private credit, 
which has constituted the bulk of the net inflow 
of capital (see table 1). 
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Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA: BALANCE ON CURRENT ACCOUNT AND NET CAPITAL INFLOW 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account Net capital inflow 
1970 1975 1977 1978- 1970 1975 1977 1978» 
Latin America -3 103 -14 046 -10 361 -14 622 4 660 15 OU 14 694 21583 
Oil-exporting 
countries -272 2 047 - 2 362 - 5 034 358 1041 2 795 3 568 
Non-oil-exporting 
countries - 2 831 - 1 6 093 - 7 999 - 9 588 4 302 13 970 11899 18 015 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
In global terms, the situation does not 
appear alarming at this stage in the light of such 
current relations as the ratio of payments of 
interest and amortization on the external debt, 
plus remittances of profits, to the value of 
exports, but—exceptions apart— it is nonethe-
less true that there is good reason to be 
concerned that these trends may continue. 
The second risk lies in the fact that the 
relatively abundant supply of external credit 
cannot be considered a prop on which it will be 
possible to rely indefinitely. This is so because 
the high liquidity of the market and the easy 
access to it are the result of exceptional condi-
tions which can hardly continue in the future, 
quite apart from the fact that the terms and costs 
of such credit are frequently not in keeping 
with the requirements of development fi-
nancing. 
This means that we must recognize that 
the chances of continued use of international 
credit by the debtor countries necessarily 
depend on their ability to rectify the basic 
imbalances in their external accounts by taking 
the positive approach of increasing and diver-
sifying their exports rather than severely res-
tricting their purchases abroad. 
As is well known, this second option would 
also harm the industrialized economies by 
weakening or eliminating one of the factors 
which have stimulated their shaky economic 
growth in recent years: namely, the demand 
stemming from their sales to the periphery. 
The third risk, as we already noted, is the 
impact of the present situation of the central 
economies on the region's growth rate and on 
inflationary pressures. 
While the region is today better able to 
defend itself than in the past, it would face a 
much more severe challenge if the restrictive 
effects stemming from the central economies 
were to continue for a protracted period. 
T h e picture is even gloomier if one con-
siders the potential inflation. Although in 1977 
and 1978 the rate of price increases declined in 
comparison with the high levels of earlier 
years, it is nevertheless true that inflation 
continues to pose difficult problems of control 
and management in a sizeable number of 
countries which have considerable weight in 
the regional total. The picture is therefore very 
unfavourable as regards the objective of keep-
ing up the growth rate, and in addition it 
involves sacrifices and social inequalities 
which hinder the concerted determination 
required to advance towards a solution. 
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II 
The great challenges of the coming decade 
The basic question which emerges as we stand 
on the threshold of a new decade is what major 
challenges Latin America will face during the 
next ten years. 
If an adequate answer is to be given to this 
question, the analysis of the main features of 
the economic conjuncture in recent years is not 
enough. A longer retrospective view is also 
required, to enable us to make an appraisal of 
the economic and social evolution of the region 
in the context of a long-term historical pers-
pective. 
This appraisal would lead to the following 
main conclusions: 
1. Since the war, and particularly during 
the 1960s and the early years of the present 
decade, the region as a whole —with excep-
tions which this is not the moment to anal-
yse— achieved vigorous development of its 
forces of production. 
This development was analysed in some 
detail in previous presentations by the Exe-
cutive Secretariat, so that only its most es-
sential features need 'to be summed up here. 
These were, firstly, the sustained growth of the 
Latin American economy, which meant that in 
1975 the joint product of the region had 
increased fivefold since 1950; secondly, the 
growth and diversification of Latin American 
exports, which continued even through the 
recent recession in the world economy; and 
lastly, the improvement of the capacity for 
handling economic policy observable in the 
Latin American countries, to which I referred, 
earlier. 
2. This definite substantial material pro-
gress, however, was not able to solve some of 
Latin America's most acute and serious social 
problems. Modernization and progress, in fact, 
only benefited certain strata of society. Others, 
particularly the great masses, remained outside 
this progress or only received its benefits 
marginally. Owing to this basic feature of the 
development style which tended to prevail in 
the majority of the region's economies, the 
number of people affected by critical poverty 
continued to be intolerably high, unemploy-
ment and particularly underemployment did 
not decrease significantly, and some social 
indicators improved only slowly or even show-
ed signs of deterioration. 
The development of the last thirty years 
was thus marked by a basic ambivalence. While 
on the one hand it revealed the region's 
capacity for increasing its material output at a 
fairly high rate, on the other it reflected a 
flagrant inability to distribute fairly the results 
of this more rapid material progress. It is this 
essential ambivalence in the development 
style which explains the contrast between the 
optimistic conclusions which may be drawn 
from the evolution of some conventional eco-
nomic indicators, such as those referring to the 
growth rate of the product, exports or inter-
national reserves, and the sometimes discour-
aging conclusions arising out of certain social 
indicators which show that in many countries 
of the region acute problems of malnutrition, 
poverty, illiteracy and underemployment con-
tinue to exist. In some cases their solution is 
desperately slow, and in others it is even more 
distressing to note that there has actually been 
a worsening of the situation. 
3. These features of internal economic 
change were accompanied by an increasing 
internationalization of the Latin American 
economies which strengthened the links be-
tween their development processes and chan-
ges in the world economy. 
The process of internationalization repre-
sented a new dynamic growth factor for certain 
countries but also involved a new and perilous 
vulnerability. The latter took shape with par-
ticular clarity when, in the middle of the 
present decade, the great growth cycle of the 
world economy which had begun early in the 
1950s was interrupted and the trend towards a 
liberalization of international trade was simul-
taneously paralysed. In recent years, as a result 
of these closer links with the exterior, the rates 
and forms of growth of the central countries 
have become basic conditioning factors of the 
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rate of internal development of many of our 
economies. 
The relative importance of the three basic 
characteristics of Latin American development 
which I have just mentioned has, of course, 
varied greatly in the different countries of the 
region. All the same, these three basic features 
which sum up the achievements, shortcomings 
and vulnerable points of the development 
process in the last 30 years are repeated to some 
extent in the experience of the great majority of 
our economies and become evident when their 
evolution is viewed from the perspective of the 
last few years of this decade. 
What we consider to be the three funda-
mental challenges which the countries of Latin 
America will have to face in the next decade 
thus emerge very clearly and can be expressed 
in the form of three questions: 
(1) Is it possible to improve the social 
spread of the development style which pre-
dominates in the region? 
(2) Is it possible also to maintain and if 
possible speed up the rate of economic growth? 
(3) Is it possible to design defence mecha-
nisms against the inestability and uncertainty 
which characterize the present world scenario, 
so as to reduce the effects of the new external 
vulnerability of the Latin American devel-
opment process? 
An affirmative answer to each of these 
questions would mean that in the next decade 
the region can indeed progress towards fair, 
dynamic and autonomous development. 
I should now like to go on to make some 
brief remarks on the possibilities of and requi-
sites for achieving each of these three basic 
objectives. 
A. T H E FIRST CHALLENGE AND 
REQUIREMENT: BROADENING THE 
SOCIAL IMPACT OF GROWTH 
As I mentioned earlier, it is a widely accepted 
fact that the dynamic growth of the region in the 
post-war period bypassed, in relative or abso-
lute terms, a sizeable part of the population. 
I do not intend to dwell on this topic, but I 
think it is worth recalling that a recent CEPAL 
study, covering six countries which account for 
Table 2 
ESTIMATES OF THE INCIDENCE OF EXTREME POVERTY IN SOME LATIN AMERICAN 






















































































Source: Oscar Altimir, La dimensión de la pobreza en América Latina, E/CEPAL/L.180, 1978, p. 81. 
"The ten countries considered account for 84% of the population of Latin America. 
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70% of the population and an equal proportion 
of the gross product of Latin America, found 
that in those countries per capita income rose 
by 26% in the period 1960-1970, a figure which 
is certainly satisfactory. Only 10% of this 
growth, however, benefited those who were 
below a given poverty line in 1960, while 60% 
of it was absorbed by the richest 20% of the 
population. Thus, in absolute terms the 40% of 
the population who were poor in 1960 in-
creased their per capita income by only 20 
dollars between then and 1970. Furthermore, 
according to the latest available data, in 1970 
about 40% of the Latin American population 
suffered from extreme poverty and almost half 
of these could be considered indigent. Al-
though the incidence of poverty varied enor-
mously from country to country, as may be seen 
from table 2, this percentage means that in 1970 
the poor of the region numbered almost 110 
million, of whom 54 million were indigent. 
With all the limitations involved in making 
a projection, and merely in order to be able to 
visualize the urgency of the changes that must 
be made in the forms of development which 
have so far characterized Latin America, it may 
be noted that if recent trends continue, by the 
year 2000 the poor of our region will have 
increased in absolute figures, although they 
will represent a smaller proportion of the total 
population. And what is more serious, the 
income gap between rich and poor will have 
increased alarmingly: a fact which runs counter 
to basic moral principles, has no justification in 
economics and constitutes an evident threat to 
social coexistence. 
The other fact of capital importance to 
which I should like to refer is that unquestion-
ably most of the managing cadres —in gover-
ment, professional and intellectual circles, po-
litical parties and basic institutions suchs as 
churches, the armed forces, trade unions and 
business associations —agree on the urgent 
need to tackle this specific problem with the 
utmost priority. This implies that there are few 
people who still believe that a dynamic growth 
process will suffice for the problem to solve 
itself. 
Naturally enough, there are differences, 
sometimes profound, in the diagnoses and re-
medies suggested or adopted, but this overall 
consensus is certainly of fundamental impor-
tance, for the collective awakening to the prob-
lem is not only a new development but also the 
pr ime and most essential condition for begin-
ning to solve it. 
The nature of the challenge facing us is 
certainly very complex, since without losing 
sight of the growth objective, which I will dis-
cuss later, we must find a means of achieving 
social justice; without renouncing the modern-
ization of society we must give preferential 
treatment to the groups which have not yet ben-
efited from technological progress; and with-
out neglecting the excellence necessary in the 
training of certain groups in our communities, 
we must broaden and improve the system of 
opportunities and rewards in such a way as to 
secure the active involvement of large groups 
in Latin American society who are still ex-
cluded from the decisions which directly affect 
their living conditions. 
1. The size of the social challenges 
One factor closely linked with the situations of 
critical poverty encountered in the region is 
that of demographic trends. The projections 
made by CELADE indicate that although there 
will be a slight drop in the population growth 
rate from 1980 onwards, in the remainder of 
this century the Latin American population 
will increase by 75% (see table 3). At the same 
time, migration from the countryside to the 
towns will continue, especially in the countries 
where the percentage of the population living 
in rural areas remains very high, and where the 
incidence of critical poverty is greatest. All this 
will increase the pressures on services and 
physical space in the urban zones. 
Furthermore, due to changes in the age 
structure of the population, the proportion of 
the total population represented by persons of 
active age will increase, and this, combined 
with higher rates of participation by women, 
will generate an increase in the labour force 
estimated at an annual average of nearly 3%, 
with the total rising from 170 million in 1975 to 
345 million at the end of the century. 
A number of studies of the region show that 
if the current style of development continues 
unchanged, the growth rate needed to prevent 
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Table 3 
LATIN AMERICA: TOTAL POPULATION, BY COUNTRIES 
















































































































Source: CELADE, Boletín Demográfico, Año XII, N.° 23, Santiago, Chile, January 1979. 
a rise in current unemployment levels would the problem is not only one of reducing 
be well above the rates achieved by most of unemployment but also of absorbing under-
the countries of the region in recent decades employment so as to ensure opportunities for 
—rates which were actually the highest ever productive and well-remunerated work for the 
recorded. entire labour force. 
The rapid growth of the labour force As will be understood, however, there are 
certainly represents an important challenge to other social challenges which must urgently be 
the capacity for job creation of the countries of dealt with: education, for example. Frequent 
the region, and this challenge increases still reference is made to the major advances 
further if it is recalled that it will also be achieve here, but the shortcomings which still 
necessary to increase the productivity and exist are overlooked. 
incomes of those who are currently vegetating It is a fact that considerable progress has 
in backward activities or are suffering from dif- been made in increasing the access of the 
ferent forms of underemployment. In this latter population to the educational system. Between 
respect, the estimates of the International 1960 and 1975, the coverage of primary edu-
Labour Office show that underemployment cation doubled in absolute terms, secondary 
affects nearly 30% of the labour force. In short, enrolment increased five-fold and enrolment 
LATIN AMERICA ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE 1980s / Enrique V. Iglesias 19 
in higher education increased more than six-
fold. It is also true, however, that despite the 
substantial effort made, illiteracy in a consider-
able number of countries ofthe region was still 
very high in 1970, while the average education-
al level ofthe labour force was still low and the 
proportion of workers without schooling was 
very high (see table 4). This last fact is par-
ticularly important since, as may be observed 
from recent CEPAL studies, the great majority 
of heads of households in situations of poverty 
have three years of schooling or less. It may also 
be noted that the incidence of poverty drops 
drastically when the head ofthe household has 
completed full primary education. 
Table 4 
LATIN AMERICA: EDUCATIONAL 
INDICATORS OF THE LABOUR FORCE 
AROUND 1970 
Average level of Proportion oí the 
education ofthe economically active 
Country economically active population without 
population (years of schooling 























Source: Data taken from the CEPAL/UN1CEF project on 
social stratification and mobility in Latin America, 
1975. 
The foregoing is a reflection ofthe fact that 
the proportion of students who complete the 
primary cycle in Latin America is still very low 
although there are substantial differences be-
tween countries. A study of 18 countries shows 
that around 1975 less than 50% ofthe students 
who had enrolled in primary education 6 years 
previously had completed the cycle, while 
more than half the drop-outs were in the first 
three years of schooling and thus ran a great 
risk of becoming illiterates from lack of prac-
tice. 
From another standpoint the tendency 
towards a predominantly urban labour force 
and the increasing numbers of persons grad-
uating from the educational systems mean 
that new job-seekers come up against a labour 
market which offers fewer opportunities than 
are required at nearly all levels, and this creates 
insecurity and frustration, both among young 
people with little education and those who 
have succeeded in completing their secondary 
education. Indeed, in some countries this 
situation is emerging even among graduates 
from higher education, who are not succeeding 
in finding jobs in keeping with their training 
and aspirations. 
2. Mission: possible! 
Although these and other related facts give 
some idea ofthe vast size ofthe tasks to be face, 
I am convinced that these are not insuperable. 
The economic growth of the region in 
recent decades, the noteworthy progress in 
technical knowledge, and the incorporation of 
increasingly large numbers of professionals 
trained in the management of public affairs 
constitute a group of factors which, united with 
a firm political will, may well remedy the social 
inadequacies that cause us so much concern. 
My optimism is thus not purely rhetorical. 
Recent studies on the problem show that 
the additional income which would have been 
required around 1970 to bring the income of 
the poor groups up to the estimated minimum 
for covering the basic overall consumption 
budget was equivalent to approximately 6% of 
the total disposable income of Latin American 
households or 12% ofthe disposable income of 
the richest 10% of the population. From ano-
ther standpoint, it would have represented 
about 22% of total public expenditure for the 
region as a whole. 
These values, of course, hide wide varia-
tions between countries, where the deficit 
expressed as a proportion of total personal 
income ranged from 0.6% to 20%, while as a 
proportion of public expenditure it varied 
be tween 3 % and over 100%. 
These relationships between the mag-
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ni tude of the problem and the amount of 
national income or total disposable household 
income clearly shows that when a point has 
been reached, as has happened in Latin Ameri-
ca, where average per capita income is four 
times the figure corresponding to the poverty 
line, the eradication of poverty appears as an 
economically feasible task.5 
If the problem is examined from the stand-
point of some basic deficiencies, much the 
same conclusions are reached. 
(a) I t is estimated that between one-third 
and two-fifths of the population of Latin Ameri-
ca suffer from nutritional deficiencies since 
their calorie consumption is below the mini-
mum requirements laid down by specialized 
international agencies. Taking as a reference 
the cost of the basket of foodstuffs used to 
de termine the poverty line, it is estimated that 
Latin America's nutritional deficit represents 
be tween 1 and 2.5% of the regional gross 
product; 
(b) As regards the educational deficit it is 
estimated that the additional cost of providing 
six years of primary schooling for the future 
cohorts would amount to somewhere between 
0.3 and 0.5% of the region's gross domestic 
product, while the additional expenditure re-
qui red to finance an adequate health system 
would absorb 1 to 1.5% of the regional gross 
product; 
(c) Finally, with respect to housing, it is 
assumed that about 1% of the gross national 
product would have to be transferred to the 
poorest families in order for their expenditure 
on housing to equal that of families whose 
income is equal to the poverty line. 
In short, to solve those deficits would 
involve reassigning income amounting to be-
tween 3.3 and 5.5% of the regional total, which 
does not seem too ambitious an objective. 
Obviously, however, it is not a question 
here of merely transferring income from one 
destination to another, or from the rich to the 
poor. After the financial transfer —and the 
difficulties which by its very nature this invol-
5 T h e per capita gross domestic product in 1970, 
expressed in dollars at that year's prices, was US$ 886 and 
the est imated poverty line at that time was a little over 
US$ 200. 
ves— real and perhaps bigger and more com-
plex obstacles arise. The operation really re-
quires the transformation of some structural 
profiles and, in the final analysis, of the mode of 
operation of the economic, social and political 
system. Only thus can the existing distribution 
patterns be permanently altered in a context of 
adequate productive dynamism which will 
guarantee higher real incomes on a stable basis 
for the poorer groups, without jeopardizing 
economic growth to the point of frustrating the 
income distribution attempt. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
consideration of these problems should have 
opened an active discussions on the nature of 
the policies and expedients capable of ap-
preciably improving the distribution of the 
fruits of technical progress and eradicating 
situations of critical poverty. 
3. Approaches to a redistribution strategy 
In this discussion —which takes place today in 
every kind of international forum — there 
emerge three lines of action and thinking: one 
deals basically with the problem of critical 
poverty; a second enlarges on this concern and 
extends it to the field oibasic needs; and a third 
integrates those objectives and subordinate 
them to the formulation ofa global strategy for 
change, capable of modifying the original bases 
of the situations of deficiency and inequality. 
I t is not possible to enter into a detailed 
examination of these positions, all of which are 
perfectly worthy of respect. Let us merely say 
that from our own point of view we see no 
absolute contradictions between them, but 
only stages of a process which should integrate 
them according to the material, social and 
political conditions prevailing in each country. 
We have no doubt that only a strategy 
which alters the structural bases and mode of 
operation of the global system can provide a 
complete answer to the complex problem we 
have before us. This does not mean, however, 
that we cannot propose and pursue more 
restricted and specific aims such as those 
linked with the campaigns against poverty or 
for the satisfaction of basic needs, which will 
he lp the collective conscience to clarify and 
mature, and provide concrete experience that 
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will facilitate the attainment of more ambitious 
goals. 
Let us examine some features of these 
three courses of action. 
(a) The critical poverty approach 
It will take t ime for the permanently favourable 
effect of the radical changes which must be 
introduced in the distribution patterns to be 
felt by the poorest population groups. There-
fore, it is necessary to design specific policies 
with a view to satisfying the most elementary 
needs of poor families as efficiently as possible 
and within the shortest possible time. 
Nutrition, education, health, housing and 
sanitary conditions are among the areas of 
intervention in which experience in Latin 
America has shown a greater or lesser degree of 
success. Notwithstanding the efforts made, 
these can be said to have been insufficient, 
both because of the volume of resources assign-
ed to those aims and because of the relatively 
limited proportion that has reached the extrem-
ely poor sectors. It is therefore necessary to 
revise the criteria for assigning public re-
sources, especially in the social sectors, and 
also to make a genuine effort to increase the 
taxation of those groups which have reaped 
most benefit from economic growth, with the 
object of providing the resources required to 
face the extreme poverty emergency. 
Furthermore, the prevailing institutional 
structure and bureaucratic and administrative 
practices are not the most suitable to take care 
of the poor population. This is because the 
decisions adopted in the social sectors are 
generally poorly co-ordinated and the "target 
groups" are not clearly defined. As regards the 
bureaucratic and administrative aspects, com-
pliance with the rules and regulations calls for 
educational and other conditions which are not 
easily fulfilled by the population ultimately 
meant to be favoured. 
These assistance-oriented policies, even if 
their coverage increases and their implementa-
tion improves, are not of course the solution to 
the poverty problem but merely help to palliate 
its most degrading features. The objective of 
overcoming extreme poverty is therefore mere-
ly the first stage of a development strategy 
aimed at achieving greater social equality. 
(b) The basic needs approach 
A second approach, which differs from the first 
because of its broader objectives, the means 
that have to be utilized and its dynamic con-
cept, consists of the satisfaction of basic human 
needs. These do not refer only to the deficien-
cies found in extreme poverty, measured in 
absolute terms; but to corrective measures 
which, including that minimum stage, permit 
self-sustaining development through the crea-
tion of productive employment and levels of 
income which permit the persons concerned to 
be integrated in the economic, social and 
political life of their national societies. In other 
words, besides satisfying certain minimum 
material needs the aim is to cover needs which, 
although not of a material kind, constitute 
essential elements of a society providing great-
er participation, equality and solidarity. 
A first problem which arises in the satisfac-
tion of basic needs is the choice of a criterion for 
defining them. Obviously, no universally valid 
prescription can be given, but the criteria must 
be determined according to the conditions 
prevailing in each country and even within the 
national frontiers some of those needs will vary 
from one region to another. This determination 
depends on the sovereignty criterion of each 
country, a fact which must be made perfectly 
clear. 
Once a criterion for identifying the basic 
needs to be satisfied and the groups to be 
favoured has been adopted by the political 
authorities, the strategy should specify the 
direct and indirect means for attaining the 
objectives. In this stage it is especially im-
portant to make sure that the policies designed 
to increase the income of the poor are not 
counteracted by a rise in the prices of the goods 
and services they consume, or that the produc-
tivity increments are not reflected merely in 
monetary income. What is really needed is for 
the increased purchasing power in the hands of 
the poor to be converted into greater per-
manent well-being based on changes in the 
magnitude and structure of supply. 
In view of the limited resources of the 
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Latin American countries, the satisfaction of 
basic needs should be compatible with other 
objectives, such as the need for sustained 
growth, the diversification of the production 
system, less external dependence in terms of 
both products and markets, the maintenance of 
certain basic equilibria and the legitimate 
consumer aspirations of the middle income 
groups. 
(c) The integral change approach 
T h e foregoing approaches necessarily lead to a 
third stage, which consists of their incorpora-
tion in a global development strategy aimed at 
el iminating contradictions between objectives 
and making the policies consistent with one 
another. 
The approaches based on the two primary 
objectives of eradicating poverty and satisfying 
basic needs must be integrated, in the dynamic 
and structural change approach, in a strategy 
which will simultaneously achieve the capital 
formation required to sustain the expansion of 
productive capacity. Experience shows that the 
spontaneous action of market forces tends to 
reproduce the inequalities of the existing dis-
tribution pattern and, of course, fails to assign 
the resources to the production of goods and 
services consumed by the poorest groups be-
cause of the small percentage of income they 
manage to obtain. Moreover, in many cases, 
private investment does not respond as quickly 
as it should to purely economic incentives. 
These considerations justify more active 
participation by the State, both in fulfilling the 
redistribution objectives and in achieving the 
level of accumulation and structure of invest-
ment suited to the growth objectives and the 
reorientation of the production structure. This 
in no way implies ignoring the important role of 
the market: it merely points to the need to 
recognize that the State fulfils an irreplaceable 
function in a strategy which assigns priority to 
the eradication of poverty and the satisfaction 
of basic needs . 
It is an empirically proven fact that the 
great social inequalities are linked with the 
structural heterogeneity of the productive sys-
tems, that is to say, the co-existence of big 
informal or traditional sectors, where technical 
progress has not yet arrived, with modern 
activities in which advanced technologies are 
used. Therefore, if it is desired to compatibilize 
growth with a reduction of the existing inequa-
lities, the expansion of the modern sectors 
should be such as to sustain a growing demand 
for employment, and a proportion of its sur-
pluses should be used to help to raise produc-
tivity in the backward and informal activities. 
Let us recapitulate, then: the greatest 
challenge facing the governments of the region 
is the need to assign preferential and im-
mediate attention to the most seriously afflict-
ed groups; to promote the creation of employ-
ment in order to make full use of the labour 
force at sufficient levels of remuneration to 
satisfy its basic needs; and to incorporate the 
marginalized sectors in the production process, 
mainly through the proper generation and 
channell ing of investment resources. 
B. T H E SECOND CHALLENGE AND 
REQUIREMENT: T O ACCELERATE 
T H E ECONOMIC GROWTH RATE 
1. The economic growth imperative 
The more equitable distribution of the fruits of 
progress and the eradication of critical poverty 
in a historically short t ime are, then, in our 
view, basic objectives of Latin America's de-
velopment policy. Clearly, however, in order to 
achieve them the region will require not only to 
raise its modest rate of economic growth of the 
past four years, but systematically attain a very 
high rate of expansion. 
Please understand me. To propose this 
does not, of course, mean to subscribe to the 
ingenuous theory that the evident situations of 
lack or inequality prevailing in the region will 
right themselves with economic growth. Very 
much to the contrary. As CEPAL has always 
maintained, to grow is important, but growth is 
not enough. No less important, in fact, is how to 
grow a n d / o r u>/iom. We have therefore repeat-
edly advocated that in order to attain genuine 
and fair economic growth in Latin America it is 
indispensable that not a few of the styles of 
development prevailing in most countries of 
the region should be changed. 
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To accept this by no means implies, how-
ever, underestimating the prime significance 
of the rapid and steady expansion of the 
production base of the economy, nor over-
looking the decisive contribution it can make 
towards a development strategy aimed at im-
proving the well-being and the employment 
opportunities and progress of the traditionally 
underprivi leged groups. 
From this point of view, the rapid and 
sustained growth of the economy is essential in 
order, first, to provide productive well-paid 
employment for the huge contingents annually 
joining the labour force and, secondly, to raise 
the productivity and income of the consider-
able proportion of the labour force which is 
currently affected by the various forms of 
under-employment. The achievement of these 
two objectives constitutes, as is well known, 
one of the most fundamental conditions of any 
policy aimed at satisfying the basic needs of the 
population and permanently ensuring a more 
equitable distribution of income. But, as we 
have said, in the remainder of the century the 
region's labour force will increase very rapidly, 
and at present about 30% of it suffers the effects 
of under-employment. Consequently, in order 
to satisfy the minimum but essential require-
ments of providing productive well paid em-
ployment for the whole labour force, the eco-
nomy will necessarily have to expand at a very 
high rate. 
T h e need for intensive and sustained 
economic growth is also evident if the implica-
tions of a redistributive policy are analysed 
from the angle of the real production structure. 
A more equitable distribution of income would 
lead to substantial changes in the composition 
of domestic demand in favour of essential 
goods, and in order that the prices of these 
goods should not rise out of all proportion 
—thus largely cancelling out the effects of 
redistribution of monetary income— it would 
be necessary to increase their production signi-
ficantly and continuously. 
Moreover, in order really and effectively to 
improve the living levels and productive capa-
city of the poorest sectors, it would be impera-
tive to increase education, health, recreation 
and housing services also to a marked extent. 
All this would in itself create important pres-
sures on the production system. Added to them 
would be the pressures generated by increased 
demand for these goods and services and also 
by the demand for other less essential goods 
and services from the middle-income groups, 
whose importance and growing significance in 
the majority of the countries of the region 
should not be overlooked. 
In these circumstances, the maintenance 
of a high rate of economic growth is also 
indispensable in order to cover effectively, 
permanently and simultaneously the basic 
needs of the hitherto underprivileged groups, 
and the needs deriving from the legitimate 
aspirations of the middle-income sectors. 
Finally, continuous and rapid expansion of 
the economy would help to increase the polit-
ical viability of a development strategy aimed 
at eradicating extreme poverty and improving 
the distribution of income. These objectives, 
by definition, imply that the more unfavour-
able is the initial situation of the various 
groups, the more rapidly their levels of income 
and consumption must grow. In a static econo-
my or one which grows only slowly, such a 
relative differentiation in the growth rate of the 
income of the various sectors would require an 
absolute decrease in the income of the richest 
groups, which would certainly contribute to 
their opposition to the redistribution program-
me. This political obstacle would, in contrast, 
be much less of a hindrance in a society in 
which global production expanded steadily 
and rapidly. In that event, the relative differ-
ence in the rates of increase in income of the 
various groups would be compatible with the 
increase in the absolute amount of income in all 
sectors, including the richest, and therefore the 
political viability of the redistribution strategy 
would be greater. 
Accordingly, whether redistribution is 
analysed from the angle of its employment 
requirements, or of the changes it assumes in 
the real structure of production, or its political 
determinants, the achievement of a high and 
persistent rate of growth is an indispensable 
although insufficient requisite of a programme 
aimed at eradicating extreme poverty and 
distributing the benefits of general economic 
progress on a more equitable basis. 
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2. Possibility of growth: the region's potential 
The rapid summary I have made of some of the 
main reasons why the accelerated expansion of 
the economy constitutes an essential com-
ponent of a redis tribu tive strategy in the Latin 
American context naturally leads to the ques-
tion of whether such accelerated economic 
growth is possible in the region. 
As recent experience has clearly shown, 
the answer to that question partly depends on 
factors which are external to the region and are 
mainly linked with the evolution of the central 
economies, the policies they adopt (particular-
ly in connexion with trade), and the progress 
made by the world community towards estab-
lishing a new international economic order 
which will be fairer and more favourable to the 
development of the economies of the Third 
World. Furthermore, any answer to this ques-
tion would have different meanings for the 
various countries of the region, whose growth 
possibilities and prospects are, of course, very 
different. 
Be that as it may —and taking these 
limitations into account— I consider that the 
answer to this fundamental question is essen-
tially affirmative. In my opinion, a rapid and 
sustained process of economic growth is not 
only necessary in Latin America but is also 
possible. 
This view —one of hopeful but realistic 
optimism— is based fundamentally on the re-
gion's vast potentialities and on the evident 
—though still insufficient— progress made 
recently in utilizing them more fully than in the 
past. 
This vast potential—whose full realization 
constitutes one of the great challenges which 
Latin America will have to face in the remaind-
er of the century— is based on four fundamen-
tal factors: the region's natural resources base, 
the magnitude and skill of its human resources, 
its capital goods production potential, and the 
size of the market. 
Let us briefly recall some basic data on 
each of these factors and formulate, also very 
briefly, some considerations on their signifi-
cance for the attainment of an accelerated 
growth rate. 
(a) The natural resource hase 
It is common knowledge that in the last few 
years, particularly since the historic oil price 
adjustment at the end of 1973, there has been 
an evident and fully justified revaluation of the 
role of natural resources in the development 
process. This has led to the rediscovery of the 
obvious principle —often forgotten in the 
recent past— that the availability of a broad and 
varied natural resources base constitutes a 
condition which, while not in itself guarantee-
ing the attainment of a high rate of growth, 
greatly facilitates this task to the extent that it is 
accompanied by policies leading to the rational 
utilization of such resources. 
From this viewpoint, and if consideration 
is given to the region as a whole, Latin America 
is obviously in a privileged position. As distinct 
from other areas of the Third World and the 
majority of the industrialized countries, Latin 
America possesses a realtive abundance of 
arable land and some countries of the region 
still have unexploited agricultural potential. 
Thus, according to preliminary calculations, it 
is estimated that the potentially cultivable area 
for the whole of Latin America is close to 575 
million hectares, of which only some 170 
million are cultivated at present. Naturally, 
these figures are subject to a wide margin of 
error and it would be a mistake to conclude 
from them that the cultivated area can expand 
rapidly and easily within the short term. Clear-
ly, however, the existence of a considerable 
area which can gradually be incorporated in the 
land under cultivation is a relatively exception-
al possibility in the world context, and its 
economic significance should not be under-
estimated. 
Latin America also possesses a broad and 
varied base of mineral resources. Although it 
must be borne in mind that there are huge areas 
of the region whose mining potential has not 
yet been explored by means of modern techni-
ques, the known reserves of some minerals are 
impressive. Thus, for example, Latin America's 
reserves of copper represent one-third of the 
world total, those of bauxite more than one-
quarter, and those of iron one-fifth. At the 
present rate of production, the known reserves 
of iron are expected to last 225 years, those of 
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bauxite nearly 200 years, those of copper one 
century, and those of nickel over 80 years (see 
table 5). 
Moreover, in the last few years Latin 
America's position has improved dramatically 
as regards petroleum and gas reserves and the 
region also possesses an enormous hydroelec-
tric potential. Suffice it to recall that this 
hydroelectric potential is one-third greater 
than that of the Soviet Union, it is more than 
double the combined potential of the United 
States and Canada, and it is four times the total 
potential of Europe. No less important, not 
more than 15% of the potential is utilized at 
present and there are therefore great develop-
ment possibilities in this field too. 
(b) The new labour force 
The availability of abundant and diversified 
natural resources is undoubtedly a propitious 
factor for achieving rapid and stable economic 
growth. It is not less evident, however, that the 
realization of the development potential impli-
cit in that natural resources base depends on 
the simultaneous existence of other factors, 
particularly the work aptitudes, skills and 
vocation of the population and its savings. 
If we consider the world scene, we will 
find that among the countries which have 
reached satisfactory levels of economic devel-
opment there are some which have possessed 
rich and varied natural resources, and others 
which, on the contrary, have had a somewhat 
modest and undiversified base of primary 
resources. All of them, however, whatevertheir 
politico-institutional régime, have had one 
fundamental feature in common, and that is 
that the prolonged process of economic expan-
sion and continuous increase in productivity 
has been preceded, or at least accompanied, by 
a substantial rise in educational levels and, 
above all, by a genuine universal i zation of 
basic education. 
From this standpoint, there is still much to 
be done in the countries of Latin America. On 
the other hand, it would be neither fair nor 
realistic to ignore the progress achieved in this 
field. These advances —imperceptible per-
haps if viewed within a short-term perspective 
and more marked in some countries than in 
others— have transformed and substantially 
improved the structure of skills of the Latin 
American population. 
As a result of this progress the labour 
force of the region is now radically different 
from that which existed, for example, barely a 
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generation ago. Thus, it includes —to mention 
only a few striking instances— a much higher 
proportion of specialized workers employed in 
a modern and far more extensive and diver-
sified urban sector and such specialized person-
nel is beginning to be found too in the more 
developed strata of commercial agriculture. 
This new style labour force also includes the 
new entrepreneurs, who are more dynamic and 
innovating than their predecessors and are in-
creasingly often found in manufacturing, agri-
culture, mining, construction, basic services, 
commerce and financial activities. It also in-
cludes new professionals and technical cadres 
whose influence is increasingly evident in 
public administration and the management of 
State enterprises. 
I t was largely due to this multifaceted 
transformation of the region's human resources 
that Latin America was able significantly to 
raise its growth rate in the decade prior to the 
start of the world recession, so that, in spite of 
the recession's negative effects and the grow-
ing protectionism of the industrialized coun-
tries, the region continued to expand and di-
versify its exports and increase its competitive 
capacity on the world markets. 
Recognition of these positive facts should 
not, of course, course us to adopt a passive and 
complacent attitude. On the contrary, it should 
lead us to emphasize the priority which ought 
to be assigned to measures for improving 
the skills and, especially, the versatility of the 
labour force, which are characteristics that—in 
a dynamic world subject to sharp changes— 
are perhaps the most essential conditions that 
must be satisfied in order to achieve rapid and 
persistent economic growth. 
(c) Capital goods production potential 
This qualitative transformation of the labour 
force has been accompanied by a continuous 
rise in the investment coefficient. This grew 
slowly but steadily from 18% in 1950 to 20.% in 
1960, to a little less than 22% in 1970, and 
much more rapidly thus far in the present 
decade, to a level around 26% in the last few 
years. 
Two of the main results of this investment 
process have been , first, the growth and diver-
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sification of the manufacturing sector and, sec-
ondly, the equally considerable expansion and 
diversification of the store of capital. Thanks to 
this, Latin America's present capacity to pro-
duce its own equipment, machinery and inputs 
of basic importance for capital formation is 
much greater than in the past. 
Thus, for example, the steel industry 
—which is generally taken as a symbol of that 
capacity and which undoubtedly constitutes a 
fundamental component of any reasonably self-
sufficient industrial system— produced 23.5 
million tons of steel in 1978, which is 80% more 
than in 1970 and five times the 1960 output. 
In its turn, the production of cement —a 
product which may in some degree be consid-
ered as an indicator of the capacity to make a 
broad range of infrastructural investments— 
was also 80% higher in 1978 than in 1970, 
which indicates that, as has been happening 
regularly since 1950, it will also double during 
this decade. 
T h e increase in the generation of electric 
energy —another key factor of the capacity to 
support growth and structural change in the 
economy— has been even greater. After in-
creasing fivefold between 1950 and 1970, it 
has continued to expand at a very high rate so 
far in this decade, to the point where by 1978 
it has already almost doubled the figure for 
1970. 
Lastly, the metal manufactures and ma-
chinery industry —which has decisive signifi-
cance in the manufacture of machinery and 
equipment— expanded its production at an 
annual rate of about 10% between 1950 and 
1970, and its growth was even more rapid in 
the first half of the present decade. As a result, 
its production in 1975 was 1,000% higher than 
in 1950 (see table 6). 
For a better appreciation of the strategic 
significance of these figures it is useful to 
compare them with those for some of the indus-
trial systems developed not too many years 
ago. Thus, if consideration is given to the group 
composed of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
France and Italy in 1960, that is, when these 
three economies, following their recovery from 
the ravages of war, had almost completed a 
decade of rapid growth and constituted one of 
the most important industrial nuclei in the 
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Table 6 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF SOME MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES 
AND SELECTED INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
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world, it will be noted that Latin America's 
electric energy generation in 1978 was 15% 
greater than that echieved by those three 
economies in 1960, and that Latin America's 
cement production in 1978 also exceeded the 
output of that group of countries in 1960. 
Moreover, Latin America's output of cement, 
electric energy and steel in 1978 was 150, 135 
and 9% higher, respectively, than that achieved 
in 1960 by Japan, which was already by that 
year another of the most Important and dy-
namic industrial systems in the world. Finally, 
the region's cement production in 1978 was 
about 30% higher than that of the Soviet Union 
in 1960, while its electric energy generation 
was only 7% less. 
It seems clear, therefore, that thanks in 
particular to the development of the region's 
manufacturing sector in the past quarter of a 
century, Latin America has today a relatively 
broad and diversified industrial base which 
ensures at least one of the conditions for a 
more accelerated and autonomous process of 
capital formation. 
(d) Size of the market 
It is a well-known fact that the existence of 
broad and homogeneous markets constitutes a 
favourable condition for growth. They enable 
economies of scale to be fully utilized, with a 
resulting reduction in production costs: a fact 
which is of decisive importance in the present-
day scene and which has undoubtedly con-
stituted the basic economic reason underlying 
the regional integration systems in various 
parts of the world. 
From this standpoint, too, taking the re-
gion as a whole, Latin America's situation and 
prospects are most interesting. Thus, in 1978 
Latin America's total gross domestic product 
was equal to over 80% of the combined product 
of the Federal Republic of Germany, France 
and Italy in 1960, it was only slightly lower than 
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the product obtained that year by the Soviet 
Union, and it was three times Japan's total 
product in 1960. 
Furthermore, if from this year to 1990 the 
region were to grow at an average annual rate 
of 7.4% —a rate which is only slightly over that 
actually obtained in the period 1970-1974 — 
Latin America's total product in 1990 would be 
20% higher that the combined product of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, France and 
Italy in 1970,10% higher than that of the Soviet 
Union for that year, and 150% higher than 
Japan's 1970 product. 
It is true that these figures relate to Latin 
America as a whole, which unfortunately is far 
from being a unified market today. However, 
they have a dual and far-reaching significance. 
On the one hand, they provide a first 
indication of the actual benefits obtainable in 
the medium term if the countries of the region 
were to progress decisively towards closer 
economic integration. In that case, the consid-
erable size of the regional market would make 
possible the installation in Latin America of 
plants which, for technological reasons, re-
quire a very high production volume in order 
for the goods produced by them to be able to 
compete on the domestic market with those 
imported from outside the area, given a reason-
able and gradually decreasing degree of pro-
tection. 
On the other hand, the figures given on the 
size of the regional market also serve to provide 
an idea of the much greater bargaining power 
our countries would have on the international 
scene if, instead of acting independently, they 
adopted a joint, or at least a co-ordinated, stand. 
3. Four requirements for a growth strategy 
As we have seen, the growth potential of Latin 
America is considerable, for the region pos-
sesses abundant and varied natural resources, 
has a labour force with far better qualifications 
than before, has succeeded in establishing an 
industrial sector of some size, and taken togeth-
er constitutes a market of sizeable dimensions. 
This potential, however, does not of itself 
guarantee that Latin America will in the future 
actually arrive at a high and sustained rate of 
growth. To achieve this it must conceive and 
apply a coherent set of policies which will also 
enable it to secure a fairer distribution of the 
fruits of this growth and a greater degree of 
autonomy. 
It would naturally be impossible to sum 
up here the essential characteristics of a devel-
opment strategy which would pursue these 
objectives. Obviously, they would also vary 
very much in the different countries of the 
region and would have to take into account the 
different political situations of each of them. 
For these reasons I only wish to mention 
what, in my opinion, are the important require-
ments for progressing towards and achieving 
the above-mentioned objectives. I would, how-
ever, stress that they do not in any way con-
stitute an exhaustive list, and I am also fully 
aware that they have very different relative 
importance in the different economies of the 
region. 
(a) Increasing domestic savings 
A first condition for achieving rapid, equitable 
and autonomous development is to increase 
domestic savings. Although in the recent past 
numerous Latin American countries have in-
creased their savings coefficients, these will 
have to be much larger in the future in order 
simultaneously to boost the growth rate and 
reach a state of relatively less dependence on 
external financing. 
It will not be easy, of course, to comply 
with this requirement, for as I already said, if it 
is really desired to progress in the fields of the 
redistribution of income and the eradication 
of extreme poverty it will be necessary to 
allocate far more resources than in the past to 
the production of basic consumer goods and 
essential services such as education and health. 
In order to enable domestic savings to be 
increased at the same time, it will be necessary 
to cut down the rate of growth of luxury con-
sumption, improve the institutional machinery 
and incentives which promote private savings 
and increase public sector savings. This latter 
will in turn require an increase in taxation, the 
elimination or at least the reduction of" non-
essential fiscal spending and the efficient 
management of State enterprises. 
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(b) The expansion of exports 
A second basic requisite for achieving the 
proposed objectives is to increase the growth 
rate of exports. It is particularly important to 
fulfil this condition if faster and continuing 
economic growth is to be achieved in the rela-
tively smaller countries, for their exports ac-
count for a fairly high percentage of final 
demand and their export growth rate therefore 
has a greater direct impact on the growth of 
production. Moreover, generally speaking the 
natural resources of the relatively small coun-
tries are less extensive and diversified, while 
they also have a smaller and less varied indus-
trial base than the larger Latin American 
economies. In view of these two circumstances, 
the possibility of speeding up growth depends 
heavily on their capacity to import a substan-
tial variety of raw materials, intermediate in-
puts , consumer goods and particularly machin-
ery and equipment , and this capacity to import 
basically depends in the final analysis on their 
volume of exports. In these countries the export 
sector thus constitutes the activity which so to 
speak "produces" a large proportion of the 
capital goods they need, and for this reason the 
continuing and rapid growth of exports is an 
indispensable condition for being able to trans-
form plans for domestic savings into real invest-
ment . 
Although it is less direct, the influence of 
the rate of growth of exports on the overall 
growth rate of the economy is also very impor-
tant in the largest and most developed eco-
nomies of the area. The import coefficients of 
these countries are generally very low, and in 
the majority of cases the structure of imports 
includes only a small proportion of non-es-
sential goods. Consequently —except for rela-
tively brief periods— the growth rate of the 
economy tends to be limited by the rate at 
which the volume of imports increases, and 
this rate in turn depends on the speed at which 
exports increase. This last relationship may 
not, of course, apply in the short-term and even 
over longer periods if the net income from 
loans and investment makes it possible to 
finance imports whose value exceeds that of 
exports during the period. This imbalance 
be tween external sales and purchases, how-
ever, can only be maintained at the cost of a 
growing external debt, whose adverse effect 
on the degree of autonomy of development is 
self-evident and the servicing costs of which 
eventually make it essential to reverse the 
disequilibrium in external trade, so that finally 
the global rate of economic growth is once 
again conditioned by the rate of growth of 
exports: hence the fundamental importance of 
rapid and continuous growth of exports for 
these economies. 
(c) Rural development and the growth of 
agricultural production 
T h e modernization of the rural sector and the 
sustained growth of agricultural production 
and productivity constitute a third basic com-
ponent of a strategy aimed at rapid, equitable 
and autonomous development. 
In the first place, rural development is 
indispensable in order to achieve a fairer 
distribution of social income, for in the majority 
of our countries the most flagrant gap is not 
that between the incomes of the capitalists 
and the workers in the modern urban sector, 
but that existing between the levels of living 
of the urban workers and those who live and 
work in rural areas. Not only is this inequality 
expressed in the different average incomes 
received by the inhabitants of urban and rural 
areas but it is reflected in a particularly clear 
and dramatic manner in the health, education 
and housing indicators, and in the fact that the 
rural population includes an extremely large 
proportion of the total number of families af-
fected by extreme poverty. 
This basic gap between urban and rural 
levels of living is, of course, a product of nu-
merous factors, some of which, like the very 
unequal distribution of agricultural property 
existing in many countries of the region, are 
structural features of the rural economy itself. 
To a large extent, this is also the result of the 
effects of economic policies which in practice 
have penalized the enterprises and workers of 
the agricultural sector. It is a fact that in not a 
few cases exchange, tariff and price policies 
have resulted in this sector receiving artifici-
ally low prices for its products while it has had 
to pay excessively high prices for its inputs and 
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for manufactures in general. It is also true that 
the agricultural sector, and particularly the 
smallest farmers, have received a very small 
fraction of the total credit available. And lastly, 
it is also a fact that fiscal expenditure on educa-
tion, health, housing, public works, training 
and technical assistance have benefited the 
inhabitants of the cities to a disproportionate 
extent, to the relative disadvantage of the rural 
population. It is therefore essential to rectify 
these discriminatory policies if the incomes of 
the rural population are to be improved and if a 
fairer distribution of national income is to be 
generated. Measures of this kind, aimed at 
striking a better balance between urban and 
rural levels of living, should be supplemented 
by activities which, like those aimed at chang-
ing the distribution of agricultural property 
and raising the organizational levels of the 
rural workers, contribute to generating a fairer 
distribution of income within the agricultural 
sector itself. 
T h e measures aimed at correcting exam-
ples of discrimination against the agricultural 
sector and the rural population, however, 
would not only be positive in that they would 
contribute to the establishment of a fairer 
distribution of national income, but would also 
be of value in that they would help to increase 
the profitability of investment in agriculture 
and augment the productivity of the rural 
labour force, thus also promoting more rapid 
growth of agricultural production and conse-
quently helping to achieve more rapid overall 
economic growth. 
This contribution would be particularly 
significant in the many countries of the region 
where the agricultural sector still generates 
the largest share of the total domestic product 
and where its growth rate is in the final analy-
sis decisive in determining the speed at which 
the economy grows as a whole. 
In many of our economies the agricultural 
sector also generates the greater part of total 
exports, and we have already seen the funda-
mental influence that the growth of exports has 
on the overall economic growth rate. Lastly, 
increasing agricultural production is important 
because the rate at which the supply of food 
increases depends on it to a large extent, and 
this in turn is one of the main conditioning 
factors both for the level of real wages and the 
stability of price levels. 
(d) Need to secure a minimum of stability in 
price levels 
Finally, I consider that another condition for 
rapid and above all continuing economic 
growth is to maintain at least a minimum of 
stability in price levels. Naturally, in the 
present circumstances, when the economies 
of the region have been obliged year after year 
to face up to strong external inflationary pres-
sures, largely originating in the continuous 
rises in price levels in the industrialized coun-
tries, this minimum stability cannot be inter-
preted in absolute tenns. 
In the light of Latin American experience, 
however, it is also evident that inflationary 
processes of any substantial intensity are es-
sentially incompatible with the maintenance of 
a high and sustained rate of" economic growth. 
These inflationary processes may perhaps 
stimulate the apparatus of production during 
short periods and with apparent ease, but after 
a short t ime this spurt in growth initially gen-
erated by inflation tends to fade out, while the 
price increases simultaneously reach unac-
ceptable levels. The need to apply policies 
a imed at easing inflation then becomes un-
avoidable, and as is evident from several in-
stances of regional experience, the stabiliza-
tion policies applied for this purpose tend to 
depress the rate of economic growth for several 
years and even cause considerable drops in the 
level of overall production and particularly in 
investment. Finally, when the cycle comes 
full circle and inflation is reduced to more 
normal levels, the average rate of growth 
achieved during the period is seen to be very 
low and the accumulation of production capital 
minimal, thus adversely affecting the possi-
bility of substantial growth in the future. 
Both at the stage of the acceleration in the 
raté'of inflation and in the initial phases of the 
stabilization programmes, real wages tend to 
decline notably, so that income distribution is 
also adversely affected. 
This is why we are convinced that the 
maintenance of a modicum of stability in price 
levels constitutes another basic requisite of a 
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strategy aimed at achieving rapid, sustained 
and equitable economic growth. 
C. T H E THIRD CHALLENGE AND 
REQUIREMENT: STRENGTHENING THE 
AUTONOMY O F GROWTH 
The experience of recent years shows that 
Latin America has pursued a more open form 
of development, more closely linked with the 
international economy. 
This is nothing new, as we are all aware, for 
the influence of external factors has been a 
historical constant in the region and in the 
developing countries in general. What is new 
are the forms this phenomenon has acquired, 
we shall now go on to discuss. 
To avoid misinterpretation, let us say that 
we consider this evolution to be positive and 
necessary for the internal development process 
in so far as it enables activities requiring more 
wide-ranging markets to be projected out-
wards, and the way ultimately opened for 
another scheme of international division of 
labour. 
We must also recognize that not all the 
effects of this relationship with the interna-
tional economy are positive, however. There 
are also risks to be identified, and an attempt 
must be made to lessen them. These risks are 
manifested, on the one hand, in the condition-
ing factors which this relationship implies for 
our development, and on the other in the un-
desirable fluctuations caused in our economies 
by the course of international events. 
Overcoming these two major liabilities 
constitutes one of the essential tasks of eco-
nomic policy. This should foster the active 
insertion of our economies into the interna-
tional economic scenario and at the same time 
reduce the vulnerability and perils involved 
in international interdependence. To the ex-
tent that these objectives are achieved, the 
autonomy of Latin American growth will be 
correspondingly strengthened. 
What should we understand by "active" 
insertion in the international economy? I think 
we should understand it as the kind of insertion 
which is fostered and selectively oriented by 
the national authorities in keeping with the 
objectives of national development. This does 
not, of course, mean ignoring the role which 
the forces of the market can and should play in 
this selection. We do not, however, believe that 
these forces should be the only factors deter-
mining the process. The linkage between the 
region and the international economy condi-
tions domestic development right from the 
start. It must therefore be oriented so as to 
uphold the main objectives of the community. 
Consequently, the linkage with the interna-
tional economy should not be entirely subject 
to the forces of the domestic market or those of 
the growing power of the transnational cor-
porations. 
In other words, Latin America should 
make the maximum possible use of the advan-
tages stemming from closer links with the rest 
of the world, but without renouncing a form of 
development defined in an autonomous man-
ner. Just as each of our societies has some form 
of national development project, so also should 
we set ourselves a national project for our 
insertion in the international economy on a 
selective basis in keeping with our own inter-
ests. 
There is no single way of doing this, of 
course. In the last analysis, the forms of inser-
tion which each country selects will be deter-
mined by the degree of development it has 
achieved, its size and geographical location, 
its traditional trade and financial relations and 
its own economic or political ideology as 
regards the development of its forces of pro-
duction and its social objectives. 
The second basic objective in this area is to 
lessen external vulnerability. In order to analy-
se the implications of this, it is essential first of 
ail to examine the new forms of the interna-
tionalization of the region. 
1. The new forms of Latin America s insertion 
into the international sphere 
I have already referred to the deep-seated 
change which Latin America has undergone 
during the last thirty years, and particularly 
during the present decade: a change which 
has substantially altered the forms of the re-
gion's insertion into the international sphere 
in at least four basic aspects. 
The first of these changes occurred in the 
structure of Latin American exports. In the 
32 
1950s, more than 95% of these exports con-
sisted of primary commodities. Today, how-
ever, industrial goods account for nearly 20% 
of the region's total exports and are worth 
around 10 billion dollars. These figures clearly 
show that the Latin American countries have 
learned to export, by placing their manufac-
tures —some of which have a high level of 
technological sophistication— in their tradi-
tional markets and diligently seeking to open 
u p others. T h e growth and diversification of 
exports thus constitutes a novel and basic 
feature of the new Latin America. 
The second change relates to the origin of 
the external financing received by the region. 
Dur ing the 1950s, the bulk of the capital en-
tering Latin America was of public origin and 
only a small proportion came from private 
sources. Nowadays, however, the percentages 
have been inverted. Four-fifths of the capital 
inflow is of private origin and only one-fifth of 
public origin. Owing to the abundant financial 
resources flowing into the region, the external 
debt increased from 10 billion dollars in 1965 
to more than 60 billion dollars in 1975 and then 
continued to escalate until it reached an esti-
mated 100 billion dollars in 1978. Latin Amer-
ica has thus become an active seeker of capital 
in the private banking markets —a situation 
practically unknown in the past. 
The third change concerns the participa-
tion of the transnational corporations. The 
increasingly powerful presence of these cor-
porations in the countries of the region is 
another manifestation of the transnational i za-
tion of the Latin American economy. It is 
estimated that in 1975 the accumulated invest-
ment of the O E C D countries in Latin America 
came to nearly 40 billion dollars, while the 
overall sales by transnational corporations in 
the region amounted to some 80 billion dollars 
—nearly twice the total value of" Latin Amer-
ican exports for that year. 
The fourth change concerns the intensity 
and the nature of Latin American demand for 
technology. As a result of the diversification of 
the apparatus of production and the progress 
of industry, regional demand for new technolo-
gies has gone up enormously and its nature has 
changed. This demand now covers the most 
varied fields and in recent years has come to 
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include nuclear technology for peaceful pur-
poses. This trend has become progressively 
more pronounced as the bases of the system of 
production have been expanded and diversi-
fied and the region has begun to produce in-
creasingly sophisticated industrial goods. 
These facts show the profile of the new 
forms of Latin America's insertion in the world 
economy and reveal how its links with it have 
become progressively stronger, with all the 
advantages but also all the contradictions 
which this involves. 
It is therefore more than ever imperative 
to answer the question we asked earlier: how 
can we lessen the vulnerability which the 
growing internationalization of the region cre-
ates in us? 
2. Lessening external vulnerability: 
the tasks of the region 
Faced with this question, a clear distinction 
must be drawn between what the region should 
do and what is incumbent on the international 
community —mainly the group of the indus-
trialized economies. 
As regards the first responsibility, we have 
already stressed that much of the action taken 
in recent years has worked towards strength-
ening Latin America's defence capacity vis-à-
vis the international economic conjuncture. 
This is why our countries must keep up the 
process of the diversification of production; 
increase and diversify their exports, both in 
terms of the number and variety of the goods 
exported and the markets on which they are 
sold; implement domestic policies of readjust-
ment so as to be able to cope with the trends 
indicated by the international conjuncture in 
such important aspects as the price structure; 
and define policies for dealing with the trans-
national corporations so as to adapt them to 
national interests. We must also regard ques-
tions of regional co-operation and policies 
aimed at closer links with and concertation of 
our conduct vis-à-vis the international com-
munity as matters of interest falling within our 
competence. 
For many years CEPAL has stoutly main-
tained that regional co-operation should con-
stitute a basic element of our development. We 
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consider that whi le this assertion continues to 
be as valid as ever, such co-operation should 
now play the additional role of serving to offset 
and defend against the vicissitudes of the in-
ternational economic conjuncture. 
This does not mean, of course, that we 
should reduce our efforts to achieve an active 
insertion in the world economy. It does, how-
ever, mean recognizing that regional co-opera-
tion is nowadays called upon to play a more 
important role than in the past, in so far as Latin 
America makes an effort to achieve the double 
objective of reaping the benefits of its active 
integration into the world economic system on 
the one hand and maintaining the autonomy of 
its growth process on the other. 
There are, it is true, indications that re-
gional integration is passing through a period 
of crisis or stagnation. Of the four formal inte-
gration schemes in existence, the Andean 
Group has stood out during the present decade 
on account of its greater dynamism, while the 
Central American Common Market (CACM) 
and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 
cont inue to face major problems and the Latin 
American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) is 
approaching the end of the period of transition 
set by the Caracas Protocol without having 
achieved any re vital ization of the integration 
process. 
Despi te these circumstances, the relations 
among the countries of the region have not 
ceased to grow during recent years, both 
through the increase in reciprocal trade and 
through joint activities of specific types. 
Between 1960 and 1977, intra-regional 
exports grew nearly three times more rapidly 
than exports to the rest of the world, so that 
their share in total exports increased from 8% 
in 1960 to 17% in 1977. The importance ac-
quired by regional trade is even greater if one 
looks at its structure, in which manufactures 
carry a far greater weight than in exports to the 
rest of the world. 
Moreover, the relative weakening of some 
of the formal integration schemes has been 
offset by a definite tendency towards the ex-
pansion of economic co-operation among the 
countries of the region through partial activi-
ties of a specific nature. Thus, the integration 
of the physical infrastructure has experienced 
sustained and noteworthy progress both in the 
field of transport and in that of communications 
and energy (especially hydroelectric energy). 
T h e Latin American countries have also given 
considerable impetus to the complementation 
of their production sectors, not only through 
an increasing flow of intra-regional investment, 
but also through transfers of technology from 
the countries which have reached relatively 
advanced stages of development. 
In this regard, the growing heterogeneity 
existing among the Latin American countries 
from the standpoint of the size of their econo-
mies, their degree of development, the natural 
resources they possess and other factors would 
appear to be a stimulus for undertaking joint 
action, in that it makes it necessary to combine 
the markets, natural resources, technological 
capacities and financial surpluses of the dif-
ferent countries. Although it would be prema-
ture to evaluate the impact of this type of 
activity on the economic development and 
complementarity of the countries of the region, 
its dynamism is certainly notable. 
What is perhaps even more important is 
the fact that the increase in mutual trade has 
contributed very effectively to mitigating the 
impact of the profound disturbances which 
have affected the international economy in 
recent years. 
At the same time, greater economic com-
plementarity among the Latin American coun-
tries would seem to be a necessary condition 
for them to reach new levels of efficiency and 
competitiveness in the world markets, particu-
larly in activities which, for reasons of scale, 
the origin of their raw materials, technological 
sophistication or the volume of financial re-
sources required, demand a joint effort by two 
or more countries. 
I am therefore convinced of the need to 
rethink the role which regional economic 
complementarity is called on to play in the 
future development of the countries of Latin 
America. This is also why we are watching 
with great interest and concern the progress 
which may be expected in some of the ongoing 
negotiations on the integration schemes. I refer 
particularly to those which are to take place 
this year within LAFTA and the continuation 
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of the negotiations taking place in the Central 
American Common Market. 
3. Reduction of external vulnerability: areas 
in which the co-operation of the international 
community is required 
It must be acknowledged, however, that the 
individual efforts of our countries and even 
their possible concerted action at the regional 
level will not be enough to achieve a significant 
increase in the degree of autonomy of our 
domestic development, for this will continue 
to be strongly influenced by what the indus-
trialized countries do or fail to do. This is why 
the Latin American countries have a vital 
interest in the future evolution of the interna-
tional economy and the process of negotiation 
of the New International Economic Order. 
I will begin by repeating that the great 
hopes of the region must continue to be firmly 
placed in this process of negotiation. When 
we look at the agonizing slowness of the 
progress made in this matter so far, however, 
we cannot feel too optimistic. Moreover, it is 
also true that the profound economic transfor-
mation of the region in the last few decades, 
and especially the new forms of our interna-
tional relations, are changing the priorities as 
regards the objectives which Latin America 
must pursue through the establishment of a 
New International Economic Order. 
Does this mean that we should take less 
interest in this new Order? 
The answer is most definitely no. It is only 
necessary to look at some of the great areas of 
international discussion to see that even 
though the relative emphasis may have 
changed, the region continues to be deeply 
interested in what goes on in the forums where 
the international dialogue is taking place. Let 
us look, for example, at some of the topics 
which are under discussion in various interna-
tional forums today. 
(a) A new international framework in the field 
of basic commodities 
A first example is that of basic commodities. 
As I already noted, these continue to represent 
80% of the total value of the region's exports. 
Traditionally, Latin America's main concern 
in this field has been regarding the proportion 
of the value of total sales which returns to our 
countries in the form of taxes on the profits of 
the big foreign commodity-exporting firms 
and the expansion of their investments. 
Now, however, the ownership of these 
enterprises has changed in many cases and the 
concern of the Latin American countries is 
centred more on the stabilization and improve-
ment of prices and the increasing of income 
from their exports of commodities. This is 
quite logical, since commodities will continue 
for many years to be a fundamental item in our 
foreign exchange income. It is therefore a 
matter of special and disquieting concern that 
in the last few decades Latin America has been 
losing relative importance in the world food 
and commodity markets both to the other two 
developing regions and to the industrialized 
countries. 
Thus, for example, between 1960 and 
1977 Latin America's share in world exports 
has dropped from 47% to 26% in the case of 
bauxite, from 70% to 52% in the case of coffee, 
from 58% to 46% in the case of sugar, and from 
2 3 % to 12% in the case of meat. 
It is easy to see the unfavourable repercus-
sions of these figures for the majority of the 
countries of the region, which still depend 
mainly on exports of these products. 
The loss of opportunities to increase our 
foreign exchange earnings implicit in the 
above figures gives grounds for reflection as 
to why the efforts made and the successes 
achieved by the Latin American countries in 
the field of exports of manufactures have not 
been accompanied by similar advances in ex-
ports of commodities. 
This is why the region must continue to 
take an active part in the discussions aimed 
at establishing a more equitable framework 
for commodity trade. It should be noted in this 
connexion, however, that the criterion of price 
stabilization is not enough, and may even be 
highly dangerous in periods of inflation like 
the present. The important thing is to secure 
stabilization of commodity trade in such a way 
that these products receive fair prices on 
international markets. 
It is necessary to advance with equal 
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determination in the fields of the marketing, 
transport and local processing of these goods. 
The recent progress made regarding the Com-
mon F u n d represents a positive albeit timid 
step towards what ought to be an authentic 
new order in this field. 
(b) External financing 
A second important aspect is that connected 
with external financing, for in the future Latin 
America will continue to need large flows of 
capital to supplement its domestic saving and 
its import capability. Although there have 
been times when it may have seemed that the 
improvement in the region's terms of trade 
had reduced the importance of external fi-
nancing, the last few years have demonstrated 
how important the provision of external re-
sources has been for the maintenance of Latin 
America's growth. 
There are also other important changes 
which should be taken into account in this 
connexion. During the years following the 
war, both Latin America and the industrialized 
countries attached great importance to official 
development aid and especially the conces-
sionary nature of the terms of credits. 
Today, our concern is centred on three 
factors directly linked with the transfer of re-
sources from the industrial countries to the 
developing countries, namely: 
(a) the progressive elimination of Latin 
America from the flows of transfers of public 
resources, both bilateral and multilateral; 
(b) the real or potential limitations on the 
region's access to capital markets and possible 
restrictions which might arise in the future; 
(c) the lack of suitable machinery for facing 
up to the new-style balance-of-payments crises. 
In one form or another, and with different 
degrees of severity, the Latin American coun-
tries have been suffering from all these prob-
lems, as they have made known in interna-
tional forums. 
The progressive elimination of Latin 
America from among the recipients of official 
development assistance is very well known. 
Of course, there is no denying that it is 
permissible and necessary for the interna-
tional community to provide support to the 
relatively less developed countries of the Third 
World in the form of generous credits on 
concessional terms. What is open to dispute, 
however, is the justice of excluding Latin 
America from access to public sources on the 
pretext that it can manage on its own by making 
use of the private capital markets. 
We believe that Latin America should 
share in public Hows both of capital and of 
technical assistance —and not only in the case 
of the relatively less developed countries, but 
also in the case oí the remainder, inasmuch as 
certain types of credit required to finance the 
development of the region can only be secured 
through public channels. 
In this context I should like to emphasize 
that the region's external savings requirements 
are large today and will be much larger in the 
future, and that private sources are not capable 
of meet ing these needs on the terms and for the 
periods which are often required. Accordingly, 
it is essential that the international community 
should continue to support such institutions as 
the Inter-American Development Bank, the 
World Bank and the regional financing agen-
cies. 
These observations lead me to the second 
issue of concern in this field: the need to 
maintain the region's access to private finan-
cial markets and to sustain the substantial flow 
of private capital currently being directed 
towards the region. Regrettably, these flows 
largely consist of short-term and medium-term 
capital, and many Latin American countries 
have still not secured full access to sources of 
long-term finance, which is so necessary in 
order to maintain an adequate rate of growth. 
Finally, some countries of the region are 
concerned at the lack of resources to deal with 
the new types of balance-of-payments crises. 
As was pointed out in the report referred to 
above prepared recently by the UNDP/ 
UNCTAD project on the balance-of-payments 
adjustment process in the developing coun-
tries, "it is important to distinguish between 
those components of a balance-of-payments 
deficit for which a developing country is 
directly responsible and those which are due 
to factors outside its control". 
And it is no less important to recognize 
that, as the report also indicates, "to the extend 
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that such deficits are merely the counterpart 
of structural surpluses in other parts of the 
system or reflect substantial price movements 
of external origin, the adjustment must take 
place over extended periods of time".6 
Even though limited efforts have been 
made to meet these financing requirements 
generated by the international economic situa-
tion in recent years, much remains to be done. 
For that reason the existence of sources of 
resources provided on terms appropriate to the 
new critical balance-of-payments situations 
should constitute one of the principal objec-
tives of the international community. 
It is therefore natural that the region is 
keenly interested in the international nego-
tiating machinery through which attempts are 
being made to establish a new international 
monetary system and to assist the developing 
countries with their balance-of-payments 
problems and external resource requirements. 
(c) Relations with the transnational 
corporations 
The relations of the Latin American countries 
with the transnational corporations —and the 
flows of investment and technology which are 
usually channelled through them— constitute 
another issue of major importance. For that 
reason the region has a strong interest in 
international negotiations on this subject and 
especially on the Code of Conduct 
Latin America has become one of the most 
attractive regions of the world for the opera-
tions of the transnational corporations, as a 
result of a set of factors including the growing 
size of its markets, the abundance, skills and 
relatively low cost of its labour force, its degree 
of institutional development and the abun-
dance of its natural resources. 
This has sharply increased the bargaining 
power of the countries of the area, and as a 
result they have come to take a more active 
stance vis-à-vis the transnational corporations 
and have sought better ways to reconcile the 
6UNDP/UNCTAD, The Balance of Payments Adjust-
ment Process..., op. cit., p. 5. 
corporations' activities with their own national 
development objectives. 
This has led to the emergence of links and 
relations with such corporations which range 
from co-production and specialization agree-
ments to agreements limited to the provision 
of technological inputs or marketing services. 
At the same time regulations have been drawn 
up to ensure that the corporations enter into 
association with local public or private capital, 
thus achieving a fairer distribution of the 
benefits derived from their activities. 
Nevertheless, concern remains regarding 
other problems, such as the role of the trans-
national corporations in generating balance-
of-payments deficits, their low level of invest-
ment from external sources, the high import 
content of the goods they produce or the ways 
in which prices are established in transactions 
within the companies. 
All this naturally calls for appropriate 
decisions as regards national regulation. 
However, it is already well established that 
this is not enough, and that to some extent 
there is an additional need for general rules, 
jointly adopted by the countries, to govern the 
activities and policies of these firms. 
(d) Control of the new protectionism in the 
industrial centres 
While laborous progress is being achieved in 
this and other areas of international negotia-
tions, certain actions are being taken in some 
industrialized economies which, because of 
their magnitude, give rise to serious concern 
in the countries of the region and throw a 
shadow over their domestic development 
efforts. I refer to the recent and marked recru-
descence of protectionist tendencies in the 
major industrial countries. I have already 
mentioned that one of the most positive factors 
in Latin America's economic development has 
been the vigorous effort to export manufac-
tures, as a result of which exports of industrial 
goods have become a factor for growth and 
stability for the countries of the region. 
Just at the time when this favourable trend 
is occurring, however, protectionist tenden-
cies are arising with increasing force in various 
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industrial countries, with a consequent adverse 
impact on our exports. 
Thus, an estimate based on CEPAL ana-
lyses of 75% of Latin America's trade with the 
United States, Japan and the European Eco-
nomic Community shows that the protectionist 
measures applied in those three markets 
caused the region to lose 2,800 million dollars 
in 1976 in terms of goods not exported because 
of the measures. That sum was equivalent to 
about 15% of the total exports considered. 
It should not be said that we are facing a 
new problem. It is well known that protec-
tionism —especially in agriculture— has a long 
history in international trade. What is worrying 
is that this phenomenon is now assuming 
different characteristics, forming a much more 
subtle and complex picture and tending to 
create a permanent system behind a screen of 
exceptional, temporary measures. 
Thus, the introduction of quotas, voluntary 
agreements, non-tariff barriers and other 
protectionist measures is tending to increase. 
Their importance is undoubtedly much greater 
as a potential threat than as a present reality, 
but there are already signs which give grounds 
for concern and reflection. 
The new protectionist measures contain 
blatant contradictions which have been point-
ed out repeatedly not only by spokesmen for 
the developing countries but also by far-seeing 
personalities of developed world. 
Firstly, there is a flagrant contradiction 
between such actions and the traditional eco-
nomic theory originated in the industrialized 
countries themselves, and also between ac-
tions of this native and the recommendations 
made by the latter countries over a long period 
to the developing nations, to the effect that 
they should open up their economies to in-
ternational competition and become more 
fully integrated in the world economy. This 
manifest contradiction is without doubt a 
special source of frustration and resentment 
for the countries of the Third World, and one 
whose consequences should not be under-
estimated. 
A second contradiction arises within the 
industrial countries themselves, and concerns 
the difference between the cost they would 
incur in opening themselves up fully to in-
ternational competition (and reorganizing their 
internal structure of production to that end) 
and the cost of the new protectionism. 
In fact, the real cost of a policy of free 
trade in the industrialized countries cannot be 
compared to those of the protectionist mea-
sures they have proposed or adopted. 
Thus, for example, a recent study carried 
out for the United Kingdom revealed that 
while between 1970 and 1975 134,000 jobs 
were lost in 24 industrial sectors as a result of 
increased imports of competing products, only 
47,000 of the losses were attributable to im-
ports from developing countries. This latter 
figure is equivalent to less than 2% of the 
labour force employed in the sectors covered 
in the report. Moreover, the net drop in jobs 
related to trade with the developing countries 
was even lower, since account must be taken of 
the rise in employment due to the increase in 
British exports to those countries. 
These and other similar data would appear 
to show that the impact on the industrialized 
economies of competition from the developing 
countries is much less than is claimed in 
attempts to justify the current growth in pro-
tectionism. 
Protectionist reactions to imports of manu-
factures from the developing world also usually 
forget that in their trade in manufactures with 
the developing countries in 1976 Europe and 
North America recorded a positive balance of 
100 billion dollars — corresponding to the net 
creation of 10 million jobs in those industria-
lized economies taken as a group. 
Moreover, the recent World Development 
Report of the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development indicates that in 
1977 the developing countries absorbed 33% 
of North America's exports of manufactures, 
while Western Europe bought only 20%. 
Furthermore, the developing countries 
purchased 25% of the total exports of Western 
Europe, while North America took only 7%. 
4. A basic requirement: the restructuring 
of the central countries' economies 
The trade trends recorded in recent years 
have once again shown that the past interna-
tional division of labour is becoming obsolete. 
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Only a genuine restructuring of the productive 
forces in the industrial countries which recog-
nizes this fact can lead to healthy and sustained 
development of the world economy. 
In the last few years, the realities of 
in terdependence have been as notable for the 
industrial countries as for the developing coun-
tries, which have long been acquainted with 
them. In this field, the conspicuous case of 
energy resources is certainly not the only one. 
As clearly pointed out by the Economic 
Commission for Europe, it should not be 
overlooked that the proportion of the gross 
product which Western Europe as a whole 
obtains from external trade has grown from 
10% to 20% in the past two decades. One out 
of every seven industrial workers in that region 
works for export. In the United States, one 
out of every three hectares of agricultural 
production serves international trade. 
Indeed , it might be affirmed that at the 
present time the old saying could be inverted: 
whatever is good for the developing world is 
also good for the industrial world. 
O n the basis of that principle it would be 
relatively easy to infer that mutual interest 
should be found in a genuine restructuring of 
the economy of the industrial countries, which 
would generate situations of prosperity that 
would be reflected in the economies of both 
the developing and the industrial countries. 
As Mr. Janez Stanovnik, Executive Secretary 
of the Economic Commission for Europe, 
stated very clearly in February 1979, in 
announcing the results of a study by the 
secretariat of that Commission on the structural 
changes and trends in European industry in 
the past two decades: "Growth and structural 
change are twins. Dynamic industrial sectors 
invariably are also the sectors which have 
been undergoing the most dynamic structural 
change. Or, if you wish, the countries which 
have been most flexible in adapting their 
economic structures towards the sectors of 
high growth and high technological innovation 
have also been at the same time the countries 
of highest economic growth. One lesson there-
fore comes very clearly from the past: namely 
that we cannot consider structural adaptation 
and change in conditions of economic stagna-
tion". 
Mr. Stanovnik went on to say that we find 
ourselves today in a completely anomalous 
situation in which the total resources that the 
governments of the industrialized countries 
spend on subsidies are equivalent to the total 
value of their imports of manufactures from 
developing countries. Today they are spending 
about 2% of their gross domestic product on 
imports of manufactures from developing 
countries, and approximately another 2% on 
different types of subsidies: an anomalous 
situation which is also closely linked with 
inflationary trends. 
In the light of these facts it is perfectly 
clear that the solution does not lie in closing 
the door to trade but in a genuine economic 
restructuring of the industrial countries which 
would involve recognition of the new interna-
tional division of labour which is a primary 
factor in the construction of a New Interna-
tional Economic Order. 
5. Strengthening Latin Americas 
bargaining capacity 
Finally, I wish to make some observations on 
what I believe is an urgent imperative: the 
improvement of the bargaining power and 
attitude of the developing world, in particular 
of Latin America. 
This bargaining power today faces new 
challenges and increasing dangers. 
The challenges derive from the new atti-
tudes prevailing today on the international 
scenario which are progressively tending to 
differentiate between the special situation of 
the so-called "intermediate countries" —of 
which most of the countries of the region form 
part— and that of the rest of the developing 
countries. 
As a result, de facto situations are being 
created which, as I have already said, are 
reflected in the growing exclusion of Latin 
America from official development assistance, 
in the tendency to discriminate between coun-
tries and groups of countries in trade matters, 
in attempts to reduce the resources assigned to 
Latin America by multilateral financing institu-
tions, in policies aimed at reducing the funds 
earmarked for multilateral and bilateral 
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technical assistance, and, lastly, in the segrega-
tion of what have been called the newly 
industrialized countries from the rest of the 
Third World economies, as in recent reports of 
national and international development 
agencies. 
A kind of abandonment of the region to 
its own forces is thus being brought about, 
precisely when the symptoms of crisis and 
instability are predominant in the world eco-
nomy. What is more, the slow progress in the 
negotiation of the New International Economic 
Order has prevented the adoption of concrete 
measures to deal with the specific and fre-
quently urgent problems of the Latin American 
countries. 
The result of these policies and trends and 
what they might mean in the future has not yet 
been analysed in sufficient depth by our coun-
tries, save for their emphatic rejection in 
international negotiating forums of any attempt 
at exclusion or differentiation. We believe that 
the subject merits detailed consideration in 
order to deal with it frankly in world discus-
sions and take a stand against the risks which 
these differentiation policies involve. 
These risks arise both in the attitudes of 
the industrialized countries and in those which 
might be generated within the developing 
countries themselves. 
In the attitude of the industrialized coun-
tries, there are in my opinion two serious 
danger. The first and perhaps the most serious 
danger is that it may be believed that the inter-
mediate countries have passed the stage at 
which they need international eo-operation. 
T h e facts clearly show that this is not the case. 
Latin America needs international co-opera-
tion and will continue to need it for many 
years. Its heavy dependence on the interna-
tional situation, its increasing investment 
needs , its eagerness to incorporate technology, 
to mention only a few significant items, are 
some reasons why the region must have the 
support of the international community to 
continue to play the dynamic role it has already 
assumed, which could be spectacularly ex-
panded in international trade and investment. 
The second and equally obvious risk 
deriving from these attitudes, which is accen-
tuated as the international negotiations fail to 
advance at the desired rate, is that of falling 
into the temptation of thinking that the pro-
blems of the New International Economic 
Order can be negotiated separately or sec-
torally, both by topics and by groups of in-
terested countries. 
This would mean renouncing one of the 
essential principles of the New International 
Economic Order, that is to say, its universal 
and global character. In our opinion, the pro-
blems which this New Order is intended to 
solve cannot be dealt with in watertight com-
partments. If there is one fact which demons-
trates the true situation in the last few years it 
is the close relationship between the fields of 
trade, financing, investment and technology. 
Therefore, it is impossible to deal with one 
independently of another, and to break that 
unity of treatment would be equivalent, in our 
view, to ceasing to deal with the integral 
essence of the situation and falling into 
piecemeal approaches which, in the long run, 
would not lead to the establishment of a fairer 
and more equitable order in international 
relation but would merely postpone the real 
solution to the problems, thus sawing the seeds 
of future controversy. 
Similar risks may be identified in the 
attitudes of the developing countries. 
The first is that, owing to the discourage-
ment in the face of the slow progress being 
made in the international negotiations and the 
differences in level of development or relative 
positions vis-à-vis the international situation 
existing among the Third World economies, 
the unity of the Third World might be weak-
ened or even shattered. 
This unity must be recognized as of fun-
damental importance, for in a world with such 
unequal negotiating powers, the negotiating 
unity of the weakest is essential. The develop-
ing countries, however large, count for very 
little at the negotiating table if they participate 
on their own. Furthermore, the developed 
countries should see in that negotiating unity 
the assurance of sound and lasting results of 
such negotiations. 
This, of course, does not rule out recogni-
tion of the existence of special interests of 
certain countries or groups of countries in the 
discussion of the complex and wide-ranging 
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problems of the New International Economic 
Order. But such special interests should be 
identified by the developing countries them-
selves and dealt with on the basis of the 
principles of solidarity which should prevail 
within the group, as well as being claimed in 
the relations with the central economies. 
It is therefore in the appropriate identifica-
tion of those diversities and in the search for 
mutual support for the interests of each country 
that the negotiating unity of the Third World 
should be found. 
The other equally evident risk is that some 
of the countries of the developing world might 
fall into the temptation of "going it alone" 
and might choose to navigate the stoomy seas 
of the international situation on their own. We 
believe that such an attitude has evident 
disadvantages and that it would be highly 
negative both for the construction of a new 
order and also for the permanent interests of 
any countries unwise enough to succumb to 
that temptation. 
All this leads us to the conclusion that it is 
necessary both to strengthen the bargaining 
power of the developing world, and to provide 
renewed impetus to the machinery for interna-
tional dialogue. Mutual interest should be a 
realistic source of inspiration, but the ethical 
compulsion generated by the existing inequali-
ties should be the great challenge for the 
construction of a better world. 
Latin American unity is essential for these 
purposes, as much for the international dialo-
gue as for progress within the frontiers of the 
region itself. This is the true meaning of 
collective self-reliance which, with good rea-
son, is being called for in the developing world. 
For us, collective self-reliance is integra-
tion, We sincerely believe that the road to 
regional co-operation has scarcely begun to be 
travelled. The results I have referred to in the 
field of formal and informal integration are 
thus only the first steps. 
There are, in fact, a great many opportuni-
ties for regional co-operation in the fields of 
investment, trade, technology and financing. 
Whether that powerful engine of our growth 
—regional co-operation— will play an increas-
ing role in our development strategies or not 
depends on our ability to see clearly where 
the common interest of each country lies. 
A similar comment applies in respect of 
the possibilities of co-operation between Latin 
America and the rest of the developing world. 
The initial contacts we have made with 
Africa and Asia have caused us to view with 
renewed optimism the co-operation potential 
existing between those regions and Latin Ame-
rica, although taking advantage of that potential 
undoubtedly requires firm and decisive poli-
tical support and also a technical information 
base for the establishment of which CEPAL is 
prepared to lend its assistance to the govern-
ments of the region. 
I l l 
Final reflections 
In all areas of life in the region, whether 
economic, social or political, time has not 
passed in vain for anybody. The region's best 
asset is perhaps its fund of experience —both 
successful and unsuccessful— which has been 
the fruit of long years of travelling the difficult 
paths of development. 
Taking stock of that experience over the 
last three decades leads to three major conclu-
sions: 
The first is that during this period the Latin 
American economies have undergone a dy-
namic process of growth and transformation. 
Although varying in intensity in the different 
economies of the region, this process has 
brought about substantial changes in the great 
majority of them. As a result, the economies of 
Latin America are today very different both in 
size and in other structural features from the 
economies of thirty years ago, when CEPAL 
began its activities. 
The second is that in the majority of cases 
the benefits of this significant economic growth 
have been distributed most unevenly among 
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the different groups of society and conse-
quent ly extreme poverty still affects vast 
sectors of the Latin American population. 
T h e third is that during this period the 
forms of Latin America's insertion in the world 
seeting have changed greatly, which, as I 
pointed out earlier, has brought some favoura-
ble consequences, and others less favourable. 
Furthermore, it is important that it should 
be clearly understood that the substantial 
changes in the political and economic sce-
narios and in the workings of the international 
economy which started to take place at the 
beginning of the current decade and which 
reached a peak the mid—1970s with the most 
profound and protracted crisis the industrial-
ized market economies have known since the 
Great Depression, have radically altered the 
external factors conditioning our development, 
T h e world economic setting of the closing 
years of this decade is indeed qualitatively 
and substantially different from that which 
existed at the beginning of the decade, and 
therefore to the foregoing conclusions we must 
add some further points which need to be 
bet ter defined. 
The first of these is that the three processes 
ment ioned earlier have taken on new features, 
almost all of them unfavourable. The wides-
pread instability of the international economy 
and the sluggishness of the central economies 
have been reflected since 1975 in lower growth 
rates in most of the Latin American countries 
and a considerable rise in their foreign debt. 
T h e simultaneous rise in external inflationary 
pressures has also meant that at the same time 
the problems of income distribution have 
worsened in many of our countries. 
A second fundamental point which should 
be borne in mind concerns the transformations 
which have occured in recent years and which 
are still occurring in the industrialized market 
economies. The capacity of the central coun-
tries to respond to the substantial changes in 
the international monetary system, the struc-
ture of world trade and the supply of certain 
strategic raw materials has proved to be much 
more flexible and effective than that of the 
peripheral countries, and has taken the form of 
the adoption of measures and the creation of 
machinery of a defensive nature. As a result of 
these responses —whose high degree of co-
ordination has contrasted with the dispersed 
efforts of the countries of the Third World— 
the influence of the central countries in the 
bodies responsible for establishing the modali-
ties and machinery which will provide the 
framework for the workings of the New Inter-
national Economic Order has remained very 
great. 
A third major event of the present decade, 
and one of particular importance to the coun-
tries of the periphery, was the raising of the 
price of petroleum. This changed radically 
—and probably definitively— one of the essen-
tial e lements on which international trade and 
the development of the industrialized econo-
mies had been based since the war. No less 
significant for the countries of the Third World, 
however, was the fact that this was a clear 
demonstration of the advantages which they 
could gain by taking joint action to secure 
bet ter earnings for their primary commodity 
exports. 
Nevertheless, as a result of the rise in the 
price of petroleum and other changes which 
occurred in the international economy, as well 
as the development of the countries them-
selves, the Latin American countries have 
tended to differ increasingly in the extent and 
forms of their insertion in the world economic 
system. The importance of this fact must not be 
neglected, since it represents a possible 
difficulty for the renewal and strengthening 
ofeconomic co-operation within Latin America 
at a t ime when the adverse circumstances 
deriving from the slow and unsteady growth 
of the central economies make joint action by 
the countries of the region more necessary 
than ever. 
It is against this background of the eco-
nomic and social development trends of Latin 
America over the long period of growth which 
came to an end in the midle of the present 
decade, and of the many profound changes 
which have occurred in the world economic 
picture in recent years, that I would ask you to 
consider the following three major concerns. 
1. How can the great mass of the Latin 
American population catch up? 
T h e first problem is to improve the distribu-
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tion of the benefits of economic growth. This, 
as I mentioned before, is a fundamental moral 
imperative of development policy. The con-
t inued existence of situations of extreme 
poverty and even indigence affecting a large 
proportion of the Latin American population 
constitutes in my opinion the clearest and most 
unacceptable shortcoming of the style of 
development , which has prevailed in the 
region. An equally important consideration is 
that the eradication of extreme poverty, in most 
of the countries of the region, is now a perfectly 
feasible objective from an economic standpoint. 
Once again, as I pointed out earlier, achieving 
this objective satisfactorily calls for the applica-
tion of systematic and coherent policies of 
redistribution accompanied by a high, steady 
economic growth rate, so that the reduction of 
social inequality goes hand in hand with a 
considerable expansion of the domestic 
market. 
2. How can new ideas be introduced into 
economic relations within Latin America? 
This expansion of the domestic market and the 
foreseeable drop in the economic growth rates 
of the industrialized countries highlight the 
need to introduce new ideas into all levels of 
economic relations within Latin America. In 
the present circumstances, these have tended 
to become defensive, in the face of the un-
favourable trends stemming from the interna-
tional economy, so that they constitute a poten-
tial on which faster, steadier growth of the 
Latin American economies could be based. 
It is important to realize that this fostering 
of bilateral, subregional and regional interrela-
tions in Latin America should be viewed as a 
complement to, rather than a substitute for, 
the growth of national markets. 
Thus , the second major concern which I 
ask you to consider —one with which CEPAL 
has been closely associated since its incep-
tion— is that of finding the machinery and 
methods for attaining this objective. 
3. How can Latin America's passive insertion 
in the international economy be transformed 
into dynamic interdependence? 
In a world of increasing economic interde-
pendence , it would be unrealistic for a region 
whose performance has depended heavily 
upon trends in international trade and finance 
to set its sights on autarky. Neither the expan-
sion of domestic markets nor a greater degree 
of economic interrelation in Latin America 
should be seen as means of reducing their 
degree of insertion in the world economy. 
Quite the opposite. The export capacity of the 
countries of the region should increase and the 
vigorous process of growth and diversification 
of exports should be pursued. At the same time, 
the rising level of income of the Latin American 
population will swell the volume of imports. 
T h e challenge lies precisely in thinking 
out how to enable the countries of the region 
to make maximum use of the opportunities 
offered by their position in world economic 
flows while minimizing their negative effects; 
how to play an active role in the design of the 
rules of the game governing trade and financial 
flows, instead of being relatively passive 
participants; and how to reconcile the eco-
nomic policy requirements needed to attain 
these objectives with those required to achieve 
the growth and redistribution targets. 
The dialogue on the New International 
Economic Order begun some years ago points 
in this direction, and we must continue to 
emphasize the set of topics it comprises, and 
devote all our powers of imagination and 
negotiation to developing it. 
I have ventured to single out only these 
three fundamental concerns. Neither their 
number nor the order in which I have men-
tioned them are the result of an intellectual 
whim. On the contrary, they represent the 
secretariat's conviction that there is a deep 
interrelationship and interdependence be-
tween them. An expansion of national markets 
which is not accompanied by joint regional 
and subregional action and lacks a proper 
insertion in the world economy could result in 
a state of technologically backward semi-
autarky, while an external insertion lacking 
these national and regional dimensions could 
represent an extremely vulnerable and depen-
dent style of development. 
Finally, I wish to pause for a moment to 
examine the implications for CEPAL of the 
identification of the three major concerns to 
which I have referred. The fact that I have 
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l imited myself to stating them and have not 
at tempted to suggest ways of solving them is 
del iberate, since my main purpose is to elicit 
guidelines from you for our future activities. 
Naturally, the secretariat has some ideas 
in this respect, and these are contained in the 
documents which we have submitted for 
consideration at the session. We are, however, 
far from understanding all the consequences 
and implications of the topics which I have 
ventured to cover in this report. Still less do 
we have all the answers about how the region 
as a whole and each country in particular can 
face up to these challenges in the new and ever-
changing conditions characteristic of the 
present world economic picture. 
This is, in my opinion, one of CEPAL's 
principal tasks in the immediate future: to re-
examine our thinking on Latin American eco-
nomic development and adapt it to the context 
of a rapidly-changing world and of a growing 
variety of options within the region itself. 
This is the challenge which the secretariat 
must tackle in the future, and whose dimen-
sions and implications we hope to be able to 
begin to examine —at least roughly, to begin 
with— when working out a new International 
Development Strategy for the region. 
We know what disappointment many oí 
these exercises have caused in the past, but 
it is important to renew our interest, by up-
dating the approaches to the preparation of a 
new strategy. 
T h e opportunities opened up to us by the 
dialogue on the strategy are many and varied. 
On the one hand, we are encouraged to reflect 
on our own internal problems, and while this 
exercise of course constitutes a sovereign task 
for each country, the dialogue can stimulate 
that reflection and enrich it with the cumula-
tive experience of each and every one of our 
countries. 
On the other hand, the discussion of the 
strategy can explicitly include a constructive 
debate on the possibilities and limitations of 
regional co-operation, so that it can thus be 
converted into support for the political task 
which must be carried out in order that regional 
co-operation may be renewed and hence 
accentuate its dynamic role in our develop-
ment process. 
Lastly, the discussion of the strategy will 
provide a further opportunity both to place the 
problems of the New International Economic 
Order within the context of a broader perspec-
tive, and to establish specific goals for inter-
national action by the governments of the 
region. 
Understood in those terms, the Interna-
tional Development Strategy should not be, as 
it was in the past, an exercise conceived 
only at the world level and from the centre of 
the United Nations system. Such an exercise, 
though undoubtedly valuable, should be 
supplemented by a regional view which, trans-
lating the global goals into regional objectives, 
will stimulate dialogue and co-operation 
among us. 
CEPAL has always been intimately 
committed to this task. Today we wish to renew 
this commitment, placing ourselves at the 
governments ' disposal in this enterprise. 
It is in this spirit, and conscious of the 
positive contribution which this discussion 
could make, that I venture to suggest to you 
that the Commission should proclaim as one 
of its great tasks for the future the prepara-
tion of the Strategy for the Third Develop-
ment Decade for the region. 
